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Despite four decades of astonishing economic growth, China’s authoritarian 
government remains firmly entrenched in power. This fact challenges modernization 
theory, which anticipates that as countries become wealthier they will also become more 
democratic. This thesis proposes that middle-class consumption is a missing variable in 
the causal chain for democratization in Northeast Asian countries under authoritarian 
control. The study examines the effects of consumption in a cross-country comparison of 
South Korea and Taiwan during the years immediately prior to their respective 
democratizations. South Korea’s middle-class consumption patterns evolved after 
decades of rapid economic growth, and state-induced wage pressure made the 
aspirational middle-class lifestyle unaffordable to lower middle-class Koreans. This 
consumption disparity caused the structurally disadvantaged working-class Koreans to 
join national protests that ultimately ushered in democracy. Examining modern China, 
the study finds a similar consumption disparity among the middle classes resulting from 
income inequality and a mobility-restraining household registration system. There exists 
a key political tension around structurally disadvantaged Chinese migrant workers 
earning lower wages and lacking welfare mechanisms afforded to urban residents under 
the hukou system. With the size of China’s lower middle class expected to sharply 
expand over the next decade, the tension around consumption could act as a catalyst for 
middle-class led democratization. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
Despite several decades of sustained economic growth, China has neither 
democratized nor undergone political reform away from its authoritarian government. An 
extensive literature review, included in chapter two of this study, suggests that more 
variables must be examined in order to explain China’s peculiar lack of political reform. 
Northeast Asian countries that experienced similar economic progression under 
authoritarian conditions, such as South Korea and Taiwan, democratized after 
establishing robust middle classes. Shifting their consumption profiles from basic 
necessities to consumer durables and luxury items prior to political reform, South Korea 
and Taiwan’s middle classes revealed consumption as an understudied yet worthy 
variable to consider in China’s democratization process. What are the effects of middle-
class consumption patterns on democratization in northeast Asian countries under 
authoritarian control? Will the evolving consumption patterns within China’s emerging 
middle class affect the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and do the consumption 
patterns of South Korea and Taiwan prior to their democratic transition offer insight for 
China? As the next wave of consumers ascends within the Middle Kingdom, these 
consumers’ material desires, spending priorities, and savings rates tell a larger story about 
the demographic’s satisfaction with the current political order than simple income levels 
alone. China’s middle class was merely 15% of the overall population in 2000, but the 
proportion of this economic stratum grew to 23% by 2012.1 Future projections indicate 
that China’s middle class could more than double in size by the year 2025.2  
Under the expectations of modernization theory, a growing middle class in 
countries that experience economic growth under authoritarian regimes will eventually 
demand greater political liberties from its government. Thus, it is important to assess if 
                                                 
1 Jie Chen, A Middle-Class Without Democracy: Economic Growth and the Prospects for 
Democratization in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2. 
2 Dominic Barton, Yougang Chen, and Amy Jin, “Mapping China’s Middle-Class,” McKinsey 
Quarterly (June 2013): 3. 
 2
certain consumption behavior in a growing middle class under authoritarian control 
reveals increased demand for political reform. If consumption patterns are revealed 
through historical examples of democratization within the same region, then this rapidly 
growing segment of China’s society could create a new impetus for democratization over 
the next decade. This study compares China’s recent middle-class consumption patterns 
to middle-class consumption patterns of two countries in Northeast Asia that 
democratized from formerly autocratic governance. South Korea and Taiwan’s transitions 
to democracy offer regional comparisons to examine the relationship between 
consumption behavior and democratization. First, the study examines the political 
economies and consumption of Korea and Taiwan’s middle classes prior to their 
respective periods of democratic transition. This data is then compared to recent 
consumption patterns of China’s rising middle class. The goal of the comparison is to test 
if rising middle-class consumption has a determinant effect on the demand for political 
reform. The thesis also examines the degree to which other intervening political and 
economic variables acted as catalysts for democracy in the ROK and Taiwan. Overall the 
thesis illuminates new explanatory factors about the lack of democratization in China. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Modernization theory suggests that the increased demands for political 
accountability from a rising middle class will be the unraveling mechanism of 
authoritarian regimes. Yet the Chinese Communist Party remains firmly intact following 
more than three decades of blistering economic success initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s 
market-oriented economic reforms. Scholars point out that the “Chinese regime has 
severed the economic freedom of capitalism from the political liberties of democracy, 
turning modernization theory on its head.”3 The first wave of post-reform middle-class 
Chinese comfortably assumed their economic pedestals without posing a sustained 
challenge against their illiberal governing regime. Despite increased wealth and exposure 
to more liberal political economies abroad, China’s first wave of middle-class citizens 
appeared content without demanding greater political freedoms from the CCP. For a 
                                                 
3 Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner, “China’s Illiberal Challenge,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 2 
(Fall 2006): 62. 
 3
myriad of reasons, greater wealth and international exposure did not cause this fortunate 
group to petition the CCP for liberal reforms. To be sure, the Party’s repression apparatus 
has successfully stifled most democratic movements before they could gain momentum. 
Nevertheless, it remains critical to discover more about the Chinese middle class and its 
potential to push for democratization in the future. Cheng Li wrote “a better informed and 
more comprehensive understanding of the Chinese middle class, from its basic 
composition to its values and worldviews—from its idiosyncratic characteristics to its 
evolving political roles in China—will help to broaden the policy options available to the 
United States and other countries in dealing with this emerging global power.”4 With Li’s 
words in mind, this thesis endeavors to illuminate the effect of middle-class consumption 
patterns on democratization and augment the existing explanations about China’s peculiar 
lack of political liberation. An increasingly market-based and liberal economy remains an 
illiberal political system, and more variables must be explored to better understand the 
unique nature of China’s authoritarian capitalism.  
C. VARIABLES AND POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
The existing literature on China’s middle class partially explains the paradoxical 
nature of this economic stratum’s failure to push for democracy. Yet, as the following 
chapter demonstrates, gaps remain in the explanation behind China’s enduring totalitarian 
system. This study examines the patterns of middle-class consumption in increasingly 
wealthy populations under authoritarian control and seeks to identify the causal effect of 
these evolving consumption patterns on the demand for democratization in these 
countries. The independent variable in this study is the economic behavior within each 
country’s middle class. For this study, the important dimensions of economic behavior 
are consumption levels, spending patterns, and savings rates among each country’s 
middle-class citizens. This study’s dependent variable is political change toward 
democratic governance. The intervening variables will include each country’s middle-
class size and income equality. These factors, as highlighted by the structuralist logic 
embedded within modernization theory, create demand for political reform in 
                                                 
4 Cheng Li, China’s Emerging Middle-Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 3. 
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autocratically governed societies. This thesis will identify the relationships and causal 
mechanisms connecting these variables to better assess the complex nature of China’s 
enduring authoritarian governance, in light of democratic transitions in neighboring 
countries. It will also examine how the authoritarian government’s response to 
democratic activism overpowers a growing, wealthier, and more-educated middle class.  
At the nexus of consumption theory and structural modernization theory, the 
study will identify the unique characteristics of the growing Chinese middle class that 
cause its idleness toward reform. One potential hypothesis to explain the inaction toward 
political change among the growing middle class is a positive perception of the Party’s 
contributions to higher living standards. In contrast to the pre-reform era, the recent 
decades of higher living standards enjoyed throughout the country are attributed 
favorably to the CCP.5 Next, many in this first wave of the middle-class citizens still 
remember the tumultuous period of the Cultural Revolution; as such, they fear any 
potential “chaos” resulting from a regime change.6 Furthermore, scholars note the initial 
post-reform middle-class citizens were Party members themselves, and many of them 
attribute their comparative affluence among the population to their Party affiliation. 
While these observations are grim for the prospects of modernization theory, the 
economic dynamics inside of China are continuing to evolve in ways that could still upset 
the political order.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses comparative case studies and analysis of consumption behaviors 
that determine the impact upon political stability. It examines the consumption behavior 
of the Chinese ascending from poverty into the lower middle class. Under modernization 
theory, rising per-capita income has a positive statistical relationship with 
democratization.7 As such, this study researches spending and savings levels in Korea 
                                                 
5 Alice Ekman, “China’s Emerging Middle-Class: What Political Impact?,” Asie.Visions 76 (June 
2015): 9. 
6 Ibid.,11. 
7 Carles Boix, “Democracy, Development, and the International System,” American Political Science 
Review (November 2011): 30. 
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and Taiwan’s rising middle class across the five-year period prior to their respective 
democratic reform movements (1982–1986). In addition to long- and short-term savings 
rates, the research efforts focus on both necessity and leisure spending as a percentage of 
overall income. Any significant similarities and correlations among the two countries’ 
data are identified. Next, the same savings and spending data is scrutinized for China’s 
rising middle class during the most recent five-year period (2009–2013). In order to 
ensure an accurate basis for comparison, currency amounts are adjusted for inflation and 
government directed monetary policies. The majority of the source data for this study is 
derived from the World Bank’s economic data archives, consulting companies’ survey 
data, and various academics’ field research. Comparing similar countries provides an 
appropriate baseline to discover causal relationships between economic variables and 
their resulting political outcomes. For every year of the respective timespans, the case 
study comparisons also examines each country’s middle class population size and income 
equality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The dependent variable of political change 
toward democratic governance encompasses societal movements (i.e. protests) that led to 
the replacement of authoritarian institutions with democratic ones. 
Establishing the research framework in this manner allows consumption data to 
be isolated for comparison in this cross-national study. The three co-regional countries 
were selected for this study because of their shared history of rapid economic growth and 
authoritarian governance. To be sure, there are many socioeconomic and political 
differences between these three countries that could present undesirable deviations in the 
data comparison. Nevertheless, a structured case comparative approach through this 
design produces the desired research outcomes.  
E. MAIN FINDINGS AND ROADMAP 
In terms of results, this thesis identifies parallels in the ROK case study that apply 
to China’s current political economy. The study reveals a consumption disparity among 
middle-class Koreans that caused them to agitate for a more inclusive political order. 
Using the South Korean model, the study found a similar consumption disparity in 
modern China as a result of income inequality and its household registration system. 
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Finally, the study offers several explanations and future prospects for middle-class efforts 
toward democratization in China. 
The chapters that follow execute the research design of this study. Chapter two 
consists of a literature review that includes the significant works on the theories of 
consumption and modernization. The review also surveys political economy literature 
around the democratic transitions in Korea and Taiwan, as well as scholarly works that 
further characterize China’s middle class. The third chapter contains the comparative case 
studies of Korea and Taiwan during their pre-democratic periods, describing their 
consumption patterns in the run-up to democratization and how the various intervening 
variables facilitated the move to democracy in both countries. The findings of this chapter 
serve as a template for comparison with China’s case study. Chapter four examines 
China’s recent middle-class consumption data and how intervening variables appear to 
facilitate or prevent democratic change, as well as identifies similarities with Korea and 







II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This study examines the link between consumption behavior and democratization 
among middle-class Koreans, Taiwanese, and Chinese at different periods throughout the 
last three decades. Modernization theory provides a causal lens to examine and predict 
China’s middle-class behavior. The authors of modernization theory offer several causal 
factors behind democratic transitions throughout history, including the democratization of 
Korea and Taiwan. The theoretical approaches reveal social and economic conditions that 
either increase pressure against authoritarian governments or strengthen their hold on 
power. The “life cycle” theory of consumption theory provided a utility function to 
explain spending and saving behavior throughout a rational individual’s lifetime. By 
employing this theory, one can foresee an individual’s economic decisions, a country’s 
savings rates, and even the consequences of demographic shifts upon overall national 
wealth.8 Consumption theory, as applied to the Chinese consumers, reveals the 
population’s perspective of future stability. Finally, the review will investigate 
contemporary works on China’s middle class and its inconsistency with the theoretical 
expectations of democratization. Through examining the enduring theories and 
contemporary explanations behind the middle class’ behavior, this review will identify 
gaps that merit further investigation toward answering the research question posed in this 
proposal. The review will also highlight the relationship between middle-class 
consumption and democratization as the foundation for assessing this study’s hypothesis. 
B. MODERNIZATION THEORY 
To date, China defies the accepted logic that a growing middle class under 
authoritarian control will push for greater social reforms and political participation. In 
order to understand the incongruities between a theoretical modernization pathway and 
China’s combination of liberal markets and illiberal politics, one must investigate the 
                                                 
8 Angus Deaton, “Franco Modigliani and the Life Cycle Theory of Consumption” (paper presented at 
the Convegno Internazionale Franco Modgliani, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, February 17–18, 
2005), 1. 
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literature regarding paths to democracy. Seminal works on democratic modernization and 
the role of the middle class in democratization include the scholarship of Samuel 
Huntington, Seymour Lipset, and Barrington Moore. Assessing the work of these early 
theorists through the hindsight of several decades, Barbara Geddes’ works synthesized 
the significant theoretical evaluations to posit a more contemporary understanding of 
democratization. 
In his study of democratization entitled The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington 
focused on the impact economic development had on spurring democratic transitions 
from 1974 to 1990.9 Huntington found that although economic factors were not 
determinative, they contributed significantly to democratization.10 In short, Huntington 
distilled three specific ways in which countries democratized during this time period. He 
first noted, “Oil price hikes in some countries and Marxist-Leninist constraints in others 
created economic downturns that weakened the authoritarian regimes.”11 Huntington then 
found that several of the third-wave democracies reached high levels of economic 
development, which allowed for an eased transition to democracy.12 Finally, Huntington 
noted the few cases where “extremely rapid economic growth destabilized authoritarian 
regimes, forcing them either to liberalize or to intensify repression.”13 The theory laid out 
in The Third Wave demonstrated the effect that a burgeoning middle class, through rapid 
economic development and late industrialization, can have on overthrowing authoritarian 
regimes. The crux of his work focused on the authoritarian government’s response to 
democratic uprisings. Of the three potential paths identified, China fits into the case of 
exceptionally rapid economic development. While swift economic growth contributed to 
liberalizing the political orders of Korea and Taiwan, similar increases in China’s wealth 
have yet to generate democracy.   
                                                 
9 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma, 1992), 5. 





Seymour Lipset’s modernization theory examined how economic development, 
financial security, and increased education levels created social changes within the lower 
income strata led to sustained democracies.14 His structuralist work on modernization 
theory examined countries of varying levels of democracy across Europe and Latin 
America. Lipset examined their average wealth, level of industrialization and 
urbanization, and education while classifying their political stability.15 Through his cross-
national analysis, Lipset determined the factors that encouraged robust democracies to 
emerge and sustain. Simply stated, he found that greater wealth in societies coincided 
with higher education levels, larger middle classes, and better social equality. 
Additionally, he asserted that political cleavages are important to establishing a vibrant, 
thriving democracy. Lipset found that “the more well-to-do and better educated a man is, 
the more likely he is to belong to voluntary organization, the propensity to form such 
groups seems to be a function of the level of income and opportunities for leisure within 
given nations.”16 This statement underscores a key parallel with modern China’s rising 
middle class: increased levels of income and leisure time.  
Given Lipset’s assertion, one should also see evidence of more voluntary 
organizations forming within China. Lipset’s research also notably found that “the higher 
one’s education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support 
democratic practices.”17 China is experiencing a historically high level of education 
among its population today, and this represents another condition making China’s case 
ripe for democratization. Finally, he noted the importance of access to growing modern 
communications and transportation to informing the impoverished portions of a society 
about better ways of life and improving their conditions.18 Government censorship efforts 
aside, China’s rural-poor are increasingly exposed to modern communications technology 
and improved transportation options. China’s democratic reform prospects appear strong 
                                                 
14 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1960), 45. 
15 Lipset, Political Man, 32. 
16 Ibid., 53. 
17 Ibid., 40. 
18 Ibid., 48. 
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through the lens of Lipset’s findings, yet the Party’s authoritarian grip on power remains 
firm. 
Barrington Moore applied structuralist theory in his study of countries along one 
of three historical paths from preindustrial to modern states, focusing on the 
arrangements of power within societies that propelled countries toward democracy.19 
Noting the example of China, Moore showed how the communist movements relied 
heavily upon the peasant majority.20 The author revealed that China’s agrarian 
bureaucracy restrained the forces of commercial and industrial modernization. This 
weakened the urban class and maintained a massive, immobile peasant class.21 Moore 
concluded that in all cases “the way in which the landed upper classes and the peasants 
reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining 
the political outcome.”22 Moore’s work examined the structure, organization, and 
strength of both the elite and middle classes. Different combinations of collaboration or 
disunity between these two classes produced a variety of outcomes for the peasant class 
throughout history. Among these combinations, Moore derived five main conditions for 
democratization. The first condition was the “development of a balance to avoid too 
strong a crown or too independent a landed aristocracy.”23 The next requirement involved 
societies’ selecting the proper method of commercial agriculture. Conditions three and 
four encompassed “the weakening of the landed aristocracy and the prevention of an 
aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers.”24 The final 
prerequisite was a revolutionary break with the past. Through the lens of Moore’s work, 
one observes how the behavior of the middle class in conjunction with the aristocracy 
ultimately steers a country’s future political outcomes. The first wave of Chinese who 
prospered in the aftermath of Deng’s reforms is now considered China’s landed 
                                                 
19 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making 
of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010), 413. 
20 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship, xvi. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., xvii. 
23 Ibid., 430. 
24 Ibid., 431. 
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aristocracy. Moore’s work suggested that this aristocracy’s potential to form a coalition 
with the next wave of the middle class would have major implications upon China’s 
future political stability. Thus, if the swelling ranks of China’s bourgeois reject such a 
coalition with the elite, democratization efforts could gain new traction. 
In a 1999 article in the Annual Review of Political Science, Barbara Geddes took a 
renewed look at the body of literature and offered a current assessment of 
democratization. She asked, “what have we learned about late-twentieth-century regime 
transition and democratization?”25 To answer this question, the author compiled much of 
the contemporary work that tested causal mechanisms proposed by the early scholars of 
modernization theory. Geddes then sifted through many of the common arguments 
related to democratic transitions and foiled several popular causal elements. The variables 
of elite-initiated movements, popular protests, pacts between elites, internal strength of 
the outgoing regime, and amnesties were all shown to have indeterminate catalytic effects 
toward democratization.26 Most importantly, she distilled elements of the theory that 
maintained valid support over the years. She confirmed, for instance, that a positive 
relationship between economic development and democracy still remained throughout 
the quarter-century.27 Next, she noted the enduring validity of earlier findings by Larry 
Diamond and Juan Linz. Citing Diamond and Linz, Geddes affirmed, “poor economic 
performance increases the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown, as it increases 
democratic breakdown and defeat of incumbents in stable democracies.”28 Alternatively 
stated, a correlation remains between regime transitions and low economic growth or 
economic crisis. In a more recent piece, Geddes similarly tested the validity of several 
studies on the causal mechanisms of democratization and found them to be similarly 
unpersuasive. Highly educated populations, income inequality, and capital mobility were 
                                                 
25 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual 
Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 115. 
26 Geddes, “What Do We Know,” 120. 
27 Ibid., 119. 
28 Ibid. 
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all found to be inconsistent catalysts of democratization.29 Geddes’ works cleaned up the 
scholarship on democratic transitions by testing thirty years of authoritarian regime data 
against the subject’s leading contemporary works. While she lamented that great effort 
yielded little additional theoretical understanding over the years, her refutation of several 
leading causal mechanisms in modernization theory lend to the importance of this thesis. 
Additional independent variables, such as middle-class consumption patterns prior  
to democratic transitions, should be tested for their potential to reveal more about  
the theory. 
Other works noted the positive relationship between increased individual wealth 
and democratization. Larry Diamond asserted that economic growth correlates with rising 
social and education standards, which move societies further toward democratization.30 
When a country grows economically, its citizens typically generate new ideas about their 
societal structures and governance. As populations under authoritarian control become 
wealthier, they eventually press for democratization at a rate beyond economic growth. 
Diamond’s observations adhere to several examples of successful democratic transitions. 
In addition to Diamond’s work, Walt Whitman Rostow offered insights into the 
relationship of national wealth, consumption levels, and modernization. In The Stages of 
Economic Growth, Rostow described the final stage as the age of high mass-
consumption.31  Rostow observed that mature economies in this stage will move away 
from the consumption of basic items and towards mass consumption of consumer 
durables. As this consumption shift occurs, Rostow posited that populations desire a more 
egalitarian society and increasingly examine the factors that are affecting their political 
structures and societal values.  Thus, increased societal wealth leads to increased 
consumption levels, which in turn leads to a greater desire for politically inclusive 
structures. Still, as Geddes noted of many other popular contemporary arguments, his 
work still fails to explain China’s illiberal democracy.  
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C. CONSUMPTION THEORY 
Franco Modigliani holds the most renowned academic work on consumption 
behavior throughout an individual’s lifetime. Modigliani produced his “Life Cycle” 
Consumption Theory in the 1950s.32 This enduring theory examined individual spending 
behaviors at various age levels, and their decisions to save and deplete assets based upon 
retirement expectations. The theory posited that individuals, regardless of income levels, 
rationally saved for retirement and crafted their consumption patterns to their individual 
needs at a given age.33 Modigliani used a utility function to explain the economics of his 
model. Of the individual consumer, Modigliani noted “his utility is assumed to be a 
function of his own aggregate consumption in current and future periods … the 
individual is then assumed to maximize his utility subject to the resources available to 
him, his resources being the sum of current and discounted future earnings over his 
lifetime and his current net worth.”34 A couple of major assumptions underpinned 
Modigliani’s model, which ultimately made the theory vulnerable to a several critiques 
throughout subsequent decades. First, he assumed that “if an individual receives an 
additional dollar’s worth of resources, he will allocate it to consumption at different times 
in the same proportion in which he had allocated his total resources prior to the 
addition.”35 Next, he assumed that an individual had no desire or expectation to leave 
inheritance. Given those assumptions, the study found that individuals’ consumption in 
any given year of their life equaled the present value of their total assets accruing over the 
remainder of their lives.36  
There are many implications to derive from Modigliani’s theory. Angus Deaton 
noted that “this simple theory leads to important and non-obvious predictions about the 
economy as a whole, that national savings depends on the rate of growth of national 
income, not its level, and that the level of wealth in the economy bears a simple relation 
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to the length of retirement spans.”37 In the case of China, Modigliani’s work offers 
explanations for individual consumption behavior. Consumption theory could identify 
Chinese perceptions about national welfare programs, future investments, and 
government stability. The theory can also model how demographic alterations will affect 
the country’s savings rate.38 Consumption levels can also be integrated into other theories 
of how economic conditions drive political change. Modernization theory relies upon 
consumption and income levels to determine how countries democratize from 
authoritarian governance. In conjunction, these two theories provide the appropriate 
explanatory mechanism for political outcomes associated with China’s consumption data.   
D. CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS 
As the theories of the previous sections demonstrated, China’s middle class 
requires further analysis to explain their relative idleness toward political reforms. While 
there is no universally accepted definition of the middle class, this study will classify the 
term based on the widely used metric of income range. To be sure, the veracity of these 
numbers can be challenged by the notion that Chinese earners often deceptively lower 
their reported incomes for the purpose of tax evasion.39 Researchers also caution about 
the imperfection of this metric as based on “huge disparities in revenue and living costs 
between China’s regions.”40 Some PRC scholars use an index of income, education, and 
occupation to overcome these disparities.41 Still, this study’s focus upon consumption 
behavior ensures that income level is the most appropriate metric. In a series of surveys 
conducted over the last fifteen years by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
researchers standardized the middle-class income range between U.S. $11,800 to $17,700 
per year.42 Based upon this range, CASS surveys reveal that China’s middle class swelled 
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from 15% of the overall population in 2000, to 23% in 2012.43 This section briefly 
chronicles the history of China’s middle class, and highlights the work of major 
contributors to the subject along the way. For this overview, the Chinese middle class 
was examined in two time periods: Mao-Era (1949–1978) and Post-Mao reform era 
(1978–present). First, this section examines the Chinese middle class, or lack thereof, 
during Maoist China.  
Scholars aptly note, “During the first decades of the People’s Republic of China, 
from 1949 to 1978, no middle-class population could emerge given the strict collectivist 
framework implemented nationwide.”44 Upon assuming governing authority, the CCP 
successfully undertook several efforts to de-stratify social classes and adhere to an 
orthodox Marxist ideology.45 Among these efforts, land reform stripped the Chinese of 
private property, and the nationalization of major industries eradicated the private 
economy.46 By 1958, scholars concluded, “the economic foundations of class 
differentiation were almost completely eliminated from Chinese society.”47 The CCP 
established the new economy in a manner that eliminated the possibility for a robust 
middle class to evolve.48 Further, the Party structured labor through a system of work 
units, or danwei, which created dependency on the party-state and ceased occupational 
mobility.49 While an insignificantly small “quasi-middle class” of managers and 
intellectuals existed during these first three decades of communist reign, this group was 
subjected to heavy persecution under an Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 and the Cultural 
Revolution in the late-1960s.50  Beyond the lack of a social stratum meriting the label of 
“middle class,” consumption patterns during this Mao-Era were also homogenized as a 
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result of redistribution, rationing, and criticisms of those living outside of the working 
class lifestyle. 51 
The modern Chinese middle class was born out of the economic overhaul during 
the post-Mao reform period (1978-present). Jie Chen’s work further categorized the post-
Mao period into three stages of privatization based upon CCP’s major policy initiatives to 
liberalize the economy.52 Chen noted, “The first stage (1978–1983) was marked by the 
official revival of private business.”53 In this stage, the constitution permitted small-scale 
private businesses to operate as a complement to the public economy. In the next stage of 
economic privatization (1984–1992), the Party allowed private enterprises employing 
more than eight individuals to operate.54 While these first fifteen years of post-Mao 
economic reform gathered momentum for the Chinese middle class, the third stage 
(1993–present) truly accelerated the rise of private wealth. Following Deng Xiaoping’s 
southern tour in 1992, the CCP officially endorsed China’s transition to a socialist market 
economy.55 Of significant note to the origins of this economic stratum, the CCP openly 
encouraged party officials to partake in private economy during this time period.56 Chen 
showed that “by the mid-1990s [party-cadres and government officials] had become the 
largest group among private entrepreneurs.”57 Consequently, the majority of first wave 
Chinese middle class owed their fortunes to holding positions within the CCP at the right 
time. Social mobility also emerged during the period, and the Chinese increasingly chose 
their own jobs and weaned-off of their previous dependence on the party-state’s 
danwei.58 The Party overhauled State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) by reducing the once-
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lucrative form of state-employment.59 The benefit-laden “iron rice bowl” positions 
associated with SOEs lost their sense of security and became less desirable in comparison 
to the burgeoning private sector. In sum, Chinese laborers now faced an incentive 
structure that drove them to desire lucrative jobs, individual wealth, and modern 
economic consumption. The gradual reforms of the post-Mao era gave rise to a small 
middle class from the economic rubble of an agrarian-peasant society. 
Cheng Li’s edited volume, China’s Emerging Middle Class, examines the 
sociopolitical ramifications of the modern Chinese middle class. Of this economic class, 
Li observed that “today a large number of Chinese citizens, especially in coastal cities, 
own private property and personal automobiles, have growing financial assets, and are 
able to take vacations abroad and send their children overseas for school.”60 The author 
acknowledged that a good portion of the middle-class individuals owe their good-fortune 
to the party-state, but he also noted the existence of a significant portion of “self-made” 
middle-class citizens. Li wrote, “Such an economically aspirant population is a double-
edged sword for the Chinese authorities … aware of the fact that the middle class has 
pushed for democratization in other developing countries.”61 Still, Li notes that most of 
the studies on the link between China’s middle class and democratization found the 
opposite relationship to exist. Instead of pushing back, the author observed that the 
“Chinese middle class has largely been a political ally of the authoritarian regime rather 
than a catalyst for democratic change.”62  
In addition to confirming the alliance between the Party and the middle class, Li’s 
volume also included crucial insights about the middle class’ consumption. Zhou 
Xiaohong and Qin Chen noted that consumption is the main method used by middle-class 
Chinese to build their identity.63 They highlighted the stratum’s recent consumption shift 
from durable goods (i.e., televisions and refrigerators) to buying houses, apartments and 
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vehicles.64 Homes and cars in particulars enable the middle-class Chinese to garner social 
recognition. In other words, modern middle-class consumption is viewed as a welcomed 
distinction from the life prior to reform.65 Zhou and Qin make a clear case for the social 
identity aspect behind recent middle-class consumption. These authors additionally note 
that “not only their values, but also their attitudes and behavioral patterns, are directly 
shaped by this status.”66 Consumption can then be said to be one of the determinants of 
middle classes’ behavior; therefore, the case to examine this variable’s effect on 
democratization is even stronger. 
Alice Ekman’s research on the features of China’s middle class revealed several 
facets of this social stratum; including their expectations, consumption, and saving 
behavior. Ekman also found that “Chinese middle-classes often seek to show their new 
class status through their living standards and consumptions practices.”67 This relatively 
new economic class notably enjoys international travel, leisure opportunities, and 
entertainment.68 In terms of perception, Ekman cited “Chinese middle-class households 
often share a strong feeling of instability … in a context of economic transition and 
absence of rule of law, they anticipate further expenses of the household and extended 
family.”69 Ekman further noted China’s underdeveloped social safety nets, increasing 
cost of medical care, homes, and advanced education.70 This instability perception is 
critical to explaining the population’s high rate of household savings. In anticipation of 
hardships and uncertain future prospects, the population appears to be withholding 
consumption in favor of savings. Moreover, Ekman found that “current and former civil 
servants appear to constitute the core of the middle-class population in China.”71 This 
large portion of the first-wave middle class attributes its relative affluence and stability to 
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the Chinese Communist Party, thus revealing a major explanatory factor behind the 
inaction toward democratic reform. Through interviews with Chinese households across 
several cities, Ekman concluded “for many Chinese households of the new middle class, 
priority goals are related to career advancement and overall prosperity of the household; 
desires for political participation are often secondary.”72 Therefore, apathy toward the 
political order also contributes to the lack of push back against the entrenched 
authoritarian regime. 
After Alice Ekman thoroughly characterized the Chinese middle class, she then 
inquired about the political impact of the next wave within this economic stratum. In her 
follow-on piece, the author determined that the new generation of middle-class Chinese is 
going to be better traveled, more exposed to the private sector, and less affiliated with the 
CCP.73 Even with that insight, she concluded “China’s middle class is not the population 
group most inclined to change or question the current political.”74 Instead, Ekman 
asserted that the countries’ population remains largely conservative and in favor of the 
political status quo.  
Presently, China’s household savings rate is significantly higher than the 
international average. The international consulting firm McKinsey predicts, “By 2022, 
more than 75 percent of China’s urban consumers will earn 60,000 to 229,000 RMB 
($9000 to $34,000) a year.”75 The massive population of new middle-class earners is 
gaining more income at the same time that the CCP is encouraging a consumption 
economy to bloom. The confluence of these two events suggests that the household 
savings rates will diminish as the next wave spends more of their income on discretionary 
goods and services. With a consumption shift underway, the current works of scholars 
focused on China’s middle class could be augmented by a comparative case study 
analysis on the political impact of consumption behavior. Comparing former 
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authoritarian countries in the region, one could determine which consumption patterns 
create a tipping point for political pushback among middle-class individuals. 
E. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman also examined the political economy of 
several democratic transitions.76 Acknowledging where the theories of modernization fell 
short, Haggard and Kaufman showed how intellectual trends shifted away from the 
economic factors of democratic transitions during the 1980s.77  The authors noted that 
modernization theory’s correlation between burgeoning capitalism and democracy failed 
to account for enduring examples of ‘successful authoritarian capitalism’ in East Asia and 
Latin America.78 To explain the disconnect between theoretical expectations and reality, 
the pair described the flexible nature of regimes confronted with the liberalizing-pressure 
of capitalism. The authors wrote, “Authoritarian governments able to avoid crises or 
adjust effectively were better positioned to resist pressures to leave office and maintained 
greater control over the timing and conditions of their exit.”79 With respect to adjusting 
the in the face of popular pressure for reform, the previously authoritarian governments in 
Taiwan and South Korea effectively suppressed dissident factions throughout their 
respective four-decade reigns. The CCP continues to effectively adjusts through similar 
suppression efforts against China’s rising number of popular protests.80 Protests among 
the working-class amassed in South Korea just prior to its democratization movement; 
thus, the ROK will serve as an excellent model for comparing and forecasting China’s 
current state in chapter four.   
Haggard and Kaufman examined three main questions in their effort to build a 
more comprehensive look at the political economy of democratic transitions. First, the 
authors examined how “economic conditions affect the capacity of ruling elites to 
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determine the timing and nature of their withdrawal.”81 In general, better economic 
conditions allowed successful repression of dissident factions. Next, they examined 
legacies of institutions on new democratic regime’s economic policymaking.82 In the case 
of Korea, the institutional legacy of cronyism and intentionally suppressed wages 
eventually added necessary steam to the reform movement. Additionally, the authors 
analyzed “the conditions under which market-oriented reform and democracy can be 
reconciled and consolidated.”83 This appeared most prominently in Taiwan, where the 
KMT spread the fruits of economic growth more equitably across all income strata. 
Haggard and Kaufman also acknowledged the existence of factors that conformed to 
modernization theory’s expectations about growing middle classes. The authors 
highlighted that “in East Asian newly industrialized countries … economic development 
resulted in the emergence of more complex, literate, middle-class societies that demanded 
increased political participation.”84 Finally, they broadly noted that, “economic crisis did 
appear to accelerate, if not cause the collapse of authoritarian regimes in a number of 
countries.”85 The crisis variable provides a key indicator to examine China’s transition 
from industrialized growth to a more sustainable, consumption-based economy. Having 
reviewed the scholarship upon which this thesis builds and having identified critical gaps 
for this study, the thesis proceeds with the case studies of South Korea and Taiwan. 
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III. KOREA AND TAIWAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
South Korea and Taiwan each survived precarious beginnings following the 
Second World War and eventually democratized after decades of deliberately designed 
economic growth. Along the path to export-led growth and pluralist governance, the two 
countries evolved under different political institutions.86 Stephan Haggard extensively 
examined the political economy of Korea and Taiwan and found several similarities in 
their early days. He concluded that both countries faced “external constraints including 
political partition, a loss of major markets, and persistent balance-of-payments 
problems.”87 Moreover, American aid overwhelmingly dictated the balance sheet of the 
fledgling Asian states.88 Given dire domestic conditions and dependence upon U.S. 
patronage, these Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) initially pursued an economic 
model of import substitution. Under structurally different institutional and political 
apparatuses, authoritarian leaders in the respective countries later steered toward the more 
lucrative model of export-oriented industrialization. The transition to democracy occurred 
in each country after comparable rapid economic growth, but their political economies 
and geopolitical history contain notable variations.  
This chapter will describe how various intervening variables facilitated growth 
and democratization in Korea and Taiwan. Further, and core to the argument of this 
thesis, the chapter also examines the role of each country’s middle class in ending the 
reigns of authoritarian regimes and evaluates consumption as a potential causal element 
behind democratization. This section reveals that, as a result of government pressure to 
ensure competitively low wages on the working class, a consumption disparity existed 
between the structurally disadvantaged Korean lower-middle and middle classes. ROK 
consumption patterns evolved in years prior to the country’s democratic transition. As a 
result, the Korean middle-class lifestyle became more expensive and the structurally 
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disadvantaged lower middle class earners could not afford the lifestyle they desired. This 
tension caused the middle-income stratum to join the national movement toward 
democracy. In Taiwan, the structural difference of an economy built upon thousands of 
smaller and medium-sized firms lent to more inclusive political-economic strategies from 
the governing regime. The larger number of firms also allowed Taiwan’s sustained 
economic growth to be distributed more evenly, and the more encompassing trajectory 
lacked a similar middle-class consumption disparity found in South Korea. Although the 
same tension did not appear in the case of Taiwan, the ROK consumption disparity 
within an expanding middle class provides an example to compare China in the 
subsequent chapter.  
B. KOREA  
South Korea’s push for democracy followed decades of authoritarian rule in the 
name of exponential economic growth. Statistics show that “between 1962 and 1987 the 
Korean economy grew at an average rate of 8.9 percent per year.”89 Several causal 
elements contributed to Korea’s astonishing growth, including: American security, shared 
sacrifice of laborers, protectionism, technocrat-guidance, and late industrialization. 
Following its establishment, the Republic of Korea (ROK) adopted an authoritarian 
government that limited democratic freedoms under a growth imperative. Three 
authoritarian rulers led the country from 1948–1987: Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-Hee, 
and Chun Doo-Hwan.90 Although he governed autocratically, Rhee was democratically 
elected. Park and Chun both came to power in coups. Each regime suppressed societal 
freedoms and consolidated political environments as they saw fit.91 After an era of 
economic growth, the ROK’s political body slowly garnered more pluralist capacity.92 
By the 1980s, Korea’s population progressively demanded political reform. As Koreans 
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slowly grew increasingly unsatisfied with their authoritarian leaders, flashpoint events 
galvanized the population into large demonstrations and sustained the undertaking toward 
democracy. The following sections examine the nature of Korea’s postwar economic 
growth and identify intervening variables responsible for the population’s movement 
toward democracy.  
1. Economic Causal Factors for Democratization 
Signed in 1953, the Korean War Armistice provided South Korea with the relative 
peace necessary to build a domestic economy. As the international landscape drove 
further into a bipolar struggle between democracy and communism, the young ROK 
economy fell under U.S. protection and inherited access to the burgeoning Western 
markets. The undeveloped country faced daunting challenges at first, and the ROK’s 
economy initially fell behind a heavily subsidized Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK). In its infancy, South Korea had to overcome monumental hindrances to 
economic growth. As an unfortunate legacy of Japanese colonizers having concentrated 
major industries in the northern half of the peninsula, infrastructure barely existed in the 
Republic of Korea.93 Moreover, the South faced an ever-present threat from its 
Communist foe to the north. The Korean War never formally ended, and Kim il-Sung’s 
rhetoric relayed a clear intent to reunify the peninsula at any moment. Driven by an 
uncertain future and domestic crisis, the ROK leaned on the security and patronage of its 
trans-Pacific ally to forge a new economy.  
Guarded by the United States from the forces of communism, South Korea’s 
government began its pursuit of economic growth through import substitution. In the 
second half of the 20th century, several Asian countries adopted a developmental state 
model to achieve rapid economic growth. Akin to Japan and Taiwan during the Cold 
War, South Korea’s economy benefited enormously from the geopolitical stability of 
American military protection. While the American security umbrella assured the ROK’s 
safety, the alliance also assured a robust market for exported goods from Korea’s 
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manufacturing sector. From 1945–1964, Korea pursued an import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI) economic strategy. In an ISI economy, Stephan Haggard explained, 
“the earnings from primary-product exports and foreign borrowing financed the import of 
selected producer goods.”94 ISI countries use the imports to manufacture nondurable 
consumer goods for their domestic markets.95 As a major international constraint, 
American aid financed much of Korea’s import substitution.96 After two decades of slow 
growth, Park Chung-Hee moved Korea away from the confines of this model in 1965. 
The shift to export oriented industrialization (EOI) occurred partially as a result of the 
dire balance of payments situation created as a result of Rhee’s policies. Revealing the 
influence of Korean sentiment in steering their leaders, the shift to EOI occurred in 
response to the popular resentment toward the cronyism of Rhee’s earlier ISI regime. 
This notably underscored the Korean population’s power to shape political policy, even 
without a democratic system in place. 
Political leaders steered the Korean economy toward the more lucrative strategy 
of exporting high-value consumer durables. In order to produce exports cost-effectively, 
the South’s labor force accepted the burden to sacrifice individual wealth and rights for 
their country’s growth imperative. South Koreans endured strenuous labor conditions and 
occupational immobility in exchange for regime survival and, eventually, shared 
economic success.97 The ROK population followed the interventionist policies of their 
authoritarian government, which sought to achieve the high growth associated with 
export-oriented economies over the demands of individual laborers.98 While this 
realignment achieved the desired economic growth, it also created political tensions 
among the working-class. This lower middle-class stratum was the disadvantaged 
segment in the new economic orientation; as such, they shouldered the encumbrances of 
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low wages and social mobility. Lower income yielded lower consumption ability, and 
this would later prove a critical impetus for the rising middle class’ demand for 
democracy.  
In addition to favorable international conditions and shared sacrifice, Korea’s 
export-oriented growth also resulted from protectionist practices. Originally articulated 
by Friedrich List, the concept of protectionism is undergirded by the belief that national 
interest should guide a state’s political economy.99 Through regulatory protection, states 
ensured that their domestic industries maintained a competitive advantage in world 
markets.100 Korean manufacturers intentionally got prices wrong in order to gain 
international market share through relatively cheaper goods. Stephan Haggard noted “in 
the early stages of export-led growth, tariffs remained high on import-competing 
goods.”101 This concerted effort effectively “governed the market” to achieve economic 
growth.102 Beyond simply exploiting Korea’s comparative advantage in the global 
market, the state intervened with sector-specific industrial incentives.103 To encourage 
firms to shift from an import substitution to export-led economy, “a significant battery of 
state supports and institutional reforms reduced the risks and transactions costs of shifting 
into the export business.”104 Additionally, Korean leaders created a close collaboration 
between private industry and government bureaucracies. This significantly shaped the 
country’s political balance and later created the conditions for popular unrest among the 
working class. In creating preferred economic interests (i.e., large chaebol), industrial 
policy in Korea also granted political power to the alliance between the military regime 
and big industry; which meant, in turn, that workers’ rights and those of small enterprises 
were diminished. As worker’s rights became the vanguard of popular demands during the 
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protests of the 1980s, the inequities of this political balance became a key steam for the 
democratic movement.  
In the shift to exports, the Korean government relied on technocrats to realign the 
economy’s production sectors and encouraged private investment from abroad. While 
identifying causal components during Korea’s period of rapid growth, Haggard pointed to 
the critical role of centralized economic policy making.105 Created in 1961, the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) consolidated several bureaus and ministries to effectively control 
the state’s budget, planning, and foreign investment.106 The new board wielded massive 
power to shape the economy and gave the state new capacities to influence the private 
sector. Alice Amsden also noted the centralized power of the state during this period. She 
found that “the Korean state acted as entrepreneur, banker, and shaper of the industrial 
structure.”107 Through guiding large chaebol conglomerates, such as Hyundai and 
Samsung, councils produced cost effective strategies that launched the ROK onto the 
export leaderboard in the global economy. In order to meet the price-points of a 
competitive global economy, Koreans in these sectors worked for low wages within a 
rigid labor market.108 Weak labor movements allowed the state to keep wages suppressed 
in order to maximize profits.109 The chaebol commanded Korea’s major production 
sectors in tandem with the in-depth economic guidance of technocrats. Haggard also 
showed that Korea stimulated high levels of private investment through “strong 
protection of property rights, authoritarian political systems, and institutional innovations 
such as business-government counsels and strong bureaucracies.”110 These measures 
assured investors and stimulated additional capital flows into Korea. While protection, 
sacrifice, and government intervention played a large hand, so did the timing of Korea’s 
growth.  
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South Korea was also a benefactor of late industrialization, which allowed its 
economic sectors to leapfrog in technology on the backs of developed nations’ 
innovations. Similar to other original Asian Miracle countries, South Korea adapted and 
improved upon technologies already developed by established industrial countries. Alice 
Amsden highlighted the late industrializing countries’ ability to “acquire, or ‘borrow,’ the 
more codified elements of a given technology without having to develop them for 
itself.”111 Her findings mirror those of an economic historian’s view on the advantages of 
economic backwardness. Alexander Gershenkron offered, “poor countries can borrow 
existing technology . . . to grow faster and to catch up to the more advanced 
economies.”112 South Korea’s export-oriented economy effectively cherry-picked from 
the technological advances of further developed countries. Having established several of 
the intervening variables contributing to economic growth, this chapter now briefly 
addresses the political causal elements behind democratization in South Korea.  
2. Political Causal Factors of Democratization 
Koreans endured several decades of authoritarian leadership, but the population 
exhibited a recurring tolerance for government suppression. Hyug Baeg Im aptly stated 
“until the mid-1980s, South Korea was a typical example of a country with a dynamic 
and rapidly growing economy that could not develop democracy.”113 Despite some key 
protest movements, Koreans continually demonstrated a willingness to accept the 
dirigisme-style of autocratic strongmen in the Executive Office. To be sure, alternatives 
arose several times after the Rhee government consolidated power over the rural elite and 
potential labor organizers.114  
Dissidents to authoritarian governance emerged and were quickly suppressed 
throughout South Korea’s path to democratization. The ROK democratically elected the 
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reformist government of Chang Myon in July 1960 for a short tenure before Park Chung 
Hee took power in a coup. The tacit acceptance of this coup demonstrated that Korean 
society did not fully embrace democracy at that point, and instead sought to maintain 
political stasis under a new authoritarian ruler.115 Later opposition factions, most notably 
Kim Dae Jung and the Kwangju uprising in 1980, sought a more democratic order and 
mobilized support from the disadvantaged elements of society under the export-oriented 
economy.116 Despite the presence of many necessary societal elements noted in 
modernization theory, the attempt at democratic transition failed under Kim Dae Jung in 
1980.117 For his role in attempting to overthrow the government, Kim was sentenced to 
death (although it was later commuted to life imprisonment.).118 This affair highlighted a 
core reason for continuity of authoritarian reign: the extreme resiliency of the military 
and institutional order of Korea’s political economy.119  
Autocracy’s staying power was also attributable to the strong alliance between the 
private sector and military apparatus under Park’s political order, as well as the continued 
support of the middle class. The chaebols benefited enormously under the Park’s Yushin 
system, and their profit margins would only suffer under democratic reform. As Haggard 
wrote, “democratic movements threatened to attack the substantial privileges that big 
business enjoyed.”120 As such, democratic movements also threatened the middle class in 
1980. Haggard showed that “the intensification of violent student protests, large scale 
riots by miners and steelworkers, and the Kwangju uprising alienated conservative 
portions of the middle class.”121 Without the support of reforms from the middle class, as 
was later observed in the successful democratization movement of 1987, the ROK’s 
authoritarian order marched on.  
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The government’s effective efforts to quash democratic uprisings played yet 
another significant role in the continuity of authoritarian government. Successful 
impositions of martial law and the use of troops to suppress the Kwangju uprising 
provided evidence of the repressive capacity authoritarian leaders effectively wielded 
during power transitions.122 Despite the existence of various opposition efforts, the strong 
support for the political economy among the chaebol-dependent middle class and 
government repression marginalized dissidents at every turn. As a result of this resilient 
centralized authority, wages and occupational mobility among the working-class 
remained deliberately stifled for several decades. 
A few explanatory factors contributed to the Korean society’s high tolerance for 
authoritarian governance. Political leaders skillfully focused society on the economic 
growth imperative more than the need for individual liberties.123 Many of the Koreans 
sacrificing for growth were impacted by the recent war. Still within the generation of the 
fight, Koreans understood that the DPRK still sought to reunify the peninsula under the 
banner of Communism. The clear and present danger of an enemy at the gates provided 
leaders with exceptional power. Rhee, for instance, masterfully leveraged the National 
Security Law to both subvert communism and to decimate his political opposition.124  
While it kept communism at bay and ensured the growth of Korea’s economy, the 
dirigiste style of the Executive branch ultimately set a course for massive popular 
demonstrations as a means to uproot corrupt governance.125 Haggard underscored that 
“the absence of institutionalized linkages to civil society made it difficult for 
authoritarian governments to contain the domestic demands for reform.”126 When the 
demands of open society are bottled up without the “safety-valve” of a robust civil 
society, the pressure will eventually erode institutional coherence and inspire revolt. As 
Hyung Gu Lynn noted of this truth, “the first two regime changes failed to engender 
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sustained democratic governments, but the memory of each—if not the direct outcome—
contributed to the gradual attainment of the threshold point.”127 In the mid-1980s, the 
ROK population finally broke through the first stage of democratization—freely elected 
governments.128 Chalmers Johnson observed, “In very general terms, pluralism promotes 
demands for liberalization, and liberalization is conducive to democratization.”129 The 
next stage of democratization focused on building institutions to sustain a more vigorous 
civil society. Growing civil societies highlight representative disparities among the 
government, and one critical mechanism to air those grievances is popular protest. The 
population engaged in demonstrations throughout Korea’s authoritarian history, and the 
legacy of the each protest compounded upon those that followed.   
In the waning days of Syngman Rhee’s regime, student demonstrations in 
response to a rigged election elevated the powerful role of popular protests in Korean 
society. In light of how powerful Rhee’s grip was over society and his opposition, the 
protests’ effectiveness in removing him only emboldened society’s perception of the 
potent tool. As Lynn illustrated, “the legend of the April Revolution, that students were 
the guardians of political virtue and held the power to topple governments, that street 
demonstrations could make a difference—became a lodestar for subsequent generations 
of activists and demonstrators.”130 Chalmers Johnson further elaborated on the important 
legacies of the 1960 revolution. The author observed the lasting implications in that “it 
was led by students, a major student martyr was created (in 1960 Kim Chu-Yol was 
tortured to death by the police just as in 1987 Park Jong-Chul died under similar 
circumstances), and authoritarian arrogance inflamed nonparticipants and caused them to 
rally behind the students.”131 Scholars argue that a key group of “nonparticipants” up 
until the mid-1980s was the middle class, and the validity of that claim will be evaluated 
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in a later section. Regardless, protests did not end with ouster of the Rhee administration, 
and the lore of previous demonstrations grew stronger over time. 
The consolidation of political authority grew even more severe under Park, and 
popular demonstrations served as a check upon presidential power grabs. Haggard 
recorded “Following the seizure of power by the military in May 1961, all political 
parties and organizations were banned, over 4,300 politicians barred from political 
activity, and the press subjected to new controls.”132 The legislature remained weakened 
under Park’s rule, and the president disbanded unions and increased instruments of 
domestic political control. Even with the tremendously centralized authority, Park 
eventually faced organized opposition over normalizing economic relations with 
Japan.133 Massive protests of broad coalitions formed in 1964 and then again in 1965 
against the terms of the treaty.134 According to scholars, those protests actually 
represented the fear that the government was using the treaty to further consolidate 
internal power.135 Widespread protests proved to be a critical tool to check and even 
overthrow the country’s once willingly accepted authoritarian leaders.136 In 1979, 
massive demonstrations were one of the most powerful mechanisms to oust the ruthless 
oppression of the Park regime.137  Still, the government continued to keen monitoring of 
organizing activity, outlawed strike and unions, and kept wages low. The repressive 
apparatus resolved the symptoms of unrest in the short term. Bruce Cumings wrote, “In 
1981 labor productivity increased 16 percent while wages went down 5 percent in real 
terms.”138 Protests broke out throughout the 1980s over increasing demands to guarantee 
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political and civil liberties.139 At the apex of decades of mounting frustration with the 
authoritarian rule, South Koreans engaged in the largest demonstration in the country’s 
history to oust Chun’s regime in 1987.140 
3. South Korea’s Middle Class 
Scholars of varying viewpoints dispute the role of South Korea’s middle class in 
the country’s democratization movement. Advocates of the group’s influential role argue 
that political overreach and common ideology finally drove the middle class to coalesce 
with student movements in toppling the authoritarian regime.141 Skeptics dismiss the 
middle class’ role, and instead point to the additional pressure on the Chun regime 
created by the international attention of the upcoming 1988 Olympics.142 Both 
viewpoints acknowledge the sizeable role of President Chun’s political blunders when he 
waffled on constitutional issues surrounding his succession from power. Neither 
acknowledges the role of evolving middle-class consumption patterns. This section 
briefly summarizes the scholarship of advocates and skeptics on the role of the middle 
class in Korea’s democratization. 
Dong Won-Mo positively attributed the Korean middle class’ contribution to the 
democratic movement. In his survey of literature on the subject, Dong found a lack of 
consensus over the size and meaning of the Korean middle class in the years prior to 
1987.143 The author examined the “primary motivating factors for an increasing and 
intermittent involvement of middle-class citizens in the anti-authoritarian political 
movement of the 1980s.”144 Dong recorded the rapid pace of social change, considerable 
rise of education rates, and the increase in gross national product per capita from the 
1960s–1980s. The presence of these societal elements firmly adhere to the logic of 
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modernization theory; acting as critical catalysts toward democratization. After 
summarizing the variations among classifications, Dong found validity in the definition 
posed by the Korean government’s Economic Planning Board. In 1987, the EPB defined 
the Korean middle class as: 
1. Have a family income of at least 2.5 times as much as that of the legally
defined minimum living cost;
2. Own and dwell in a separate house or apartment, or rent a house or
apartment with a deposit to be repaid on leaving;
3. Be employed on a full-time basis or own his/her enterprise(s); and
4. Attain high school graduation or above in education.145
The EPB reported that 35% of the Korean population met these objective criteria 
in 1980, and by 1985 that percentage rose to 38%.146 A World Bank report on the ROK’s 
income distribution in 1985 also revealed a similarly large and influential middle class.147 
In conjunction with data from the Economic Planning Board, the report showed that the 
upper 20% of Korean income earners had access to 44% of national income.148 The same 
report indicated that the middle 40% income bracket, or middle class, had access to 39% 
of the national income. While the lowest 40% of income earners fared worse in 
accessible capital than the top tiers, it remains that the ROK’s middle class was sizable 
and financially influential. Dong also noted stability among Korea’s income distribution 
throughout the period of economic growth. From 1965–1986, the author found that 
“while the rich got richer, the middle-income group did not proportionally dwindle.”149 
This definition provided objective criteria to assess the existence and strength of an 
income stratum, but a further examination of the data revealed two factors that are critical 
to understand the politic motivations of the Korean middle class.  
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An important aspect arose in a skeptic’s dissent from the EPB’s broad middle-
class definition. A Ch’ungbuk University political sociologist, Professor So Kwan-mo, 
took issue with the board’s portrayal of the middle class. His 1987 survey data broke the 
middle class down even further, and suggested the existence of a lower middle class or 
working-class tier.150 This lower middle-class tier was financially better off than the 
lower class, which So classified as urban semi-proletariats, farmers, and fishermen.151 
This suggests that if average incomes rose, which they did from 1980–1987, then a new 
wave of middle class would rise out of the lower middle-class bracket. The existence and 
socioeconomic climb of the working class throughout the 1980s offered insight into the 
evolving consumption patterns of the middle class. The aspirations of those in the lower 
middle-income class to improve their material quality of life played a critical role in the 
protests of 1987. This study takes a closer look at the dynamic of socioeconomic mobility 
between income classes in the next section. 
Another notable aspect of survey respondent data across several 1987 studies 
found that significantly more Koreans subjectively self-identified as middle-class than 
met the objective criteria.152 This suggests that there was a desire among lower middle-
class Koreans to identify with the next income echelon, which is important when later 
examining the desire to consume goods reflective of a middle-class lifestyle. Of this 
phenomenon, Dong noted: 
This perception of the middle class among the Korean public has 
important implications for the political attitudes and behavior of the 
middle class, as it is after all their own opinion of the “political self” and 
their sense of group identity that largely determine how they act and 
interact in the political process.153 
Although the political motivations are still debatable throughout the 1980s, the 
evolution of the middle class’ material desires is commonly accepted. Characterizing the 
middle class as preoccupied with material improvement, Korean Professor Zinn Dokyu 
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wrote, “they are proud to exhibit their improved social position.”154 This social 
consciousness among a new wave of middle class is very similar to what Alice Ekman 
wrote about the consumption habits of the modern rising middle class in China. This 
presents a critical node for modeling the causal effects of middle-class consumption 
behavior in the next chapter of this study. 
While Dong Won-Mo summarized the literature and validated the EPB’s 
definition of the middle class, his research fell short on the motivations of the middle 
class. Dong found that ideological coalescence between the student movements and the 
middle class occurred only after two egregious abuses of regime power—the Sexual 
Interrogation Incident in 1986 and Pak Jong-ch’ol Torture Death of 1987.155 Dong 
claimed that these punctuated incidents transformed the previously timid middle class 
into an outward political force to topple the regime in July 1987. The author claimed, 
“the abuse of state power in violation of constitutionally guaranteed human rights went 
one step beyond the outer limits of people’s tolerance and patience.”156 In his assessment, 
the combined power of the students and middle-class demonstrations was critical to the 
country’s transition from authoritarian reign. This highlighted the building structural 
pressures for democracy, but argues that specific events served as the actual trigger for 
the democratization movement to gain full force. While there is merit to Dong’s 
assertions, they ultimately fall short in identifying a critical tension between the rising 
middle class and government: new consumption desires were outpacing decades of 
intentionally depressed labor wages as the working-class ascended into the middle class. 
The following section presents evidence that a critical yet understudied variable, middle-
class consumption, was of substantial influence to the democratization of Korea.  
4. Middle-Class Consumption 
A disparity of purchasing power between Korea’s middle and lower-middle 
income echelons developed prior to the popular protests for reform, yet the consumption 
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metric remains overlooked in the debate over the middle class’ influence on 
democratization.157 A Korean country-study commissioned by the U.S. Government 
revealed evidence that middle-class consumption played a significant role in the 
transformational unrest of 1987. Even as household income rose in throughout the 1980s, 
labor unions aggressively hit the picket lines to demand even higher wages and improved 
conditions.158 Andreas Savada characterized this group of working-class as galvanized by 
“reports that the rate of South Korea’s economic growth was greater than the 
improvements in their own incomes and life-styles.”159 As the Korean lower middle class 
became increasingly surrounded by a new age of consumer goods and services, their 
desires to achieve consumption parity with the higher-income strata drove them to protest 
for better wages. These frequent demonstrations in the labor arena eventually merged 
with the larger student-led national protests over President Chun’s abuse of power. Thus, 
the consumption desires of an inadequately compensated Korean working-class provided 
a critical impetus to usher authoritarian governance out of Seoul.  
The global marketplace evolved heavily throughout the mid-80s, and the Korean 
middle class required higher wages for its increasing appetite for consumption. Savada 
captured the perspective of these hardworking laborers as they began to feel priced out of 
a better life. The author portrayed this class as caught in “a revolution of rising 
expectations, as a wave of rising urban land values and housing costs outpaced average 
real wage increases of more than 70 percent during the 1980s.”160 Beyond rising housing 
costs, lower middle-class earners worked at a feverish pace just to remain above the line 
of the lowest-income stratum. Cataloging the mounting grievances of the working-class 
during this time, Frederic Deyo recorded “real wage declines, layoffs, and unacceptable 
working conditions.”161 Frustration mounted, as this group also had to work extremely 
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long hours to maintain job security with low wages and virtually no benefits.162 In fact, 
the ROK had the world’s longest average workweek hours at 54.7 hours in 1986.163 
Savada summarized the grievances of the working-class during the period of democratic 
transition: 
In 1986 the average wage of a South Korean worker was U.S. $381 a month 
(339,474 won), including overtime and all allowances. The basic wage was $287, 
or 255,408 won, but, according to the government, the basic wage necessary to 
sustain a “decent” way of life was $588 (524,113 won). Thus, the average worker 
only earned two-thirds of what the government thought necessary to sustain a 
family of four.164  
In other words, even the government perceived that average South Korean labor 
wages were not adequate to provide beyond necessity spending. While the middle class 
was already incorporated into Park and Chun’s political economy strategy, this new 
lower middle-income stratum was not adequately assimilated into the political balance 
under the same economic models. 
This pressure for increased wages manifested in organized labor strikes, which 
drove middle-class incomes higher in the 1980s. The South Korean country study pointed 
out that that between 1985 and 1988, average household income rose 14.8% per year.165 
The average household earned U.S. $8,645 annually in 1985, and that metric jumped to 
$13,081 by 1988. The Gini coefficient only modestly decreased during that same four-
year transition period, from 0.3449 to 0.3355.166 Savada wrote, “although wages had 
increased substantially in the late 1980s, this increase was not because of the good will of 
the chaebol or the government, but was the result of a great many strikes and a shortage 
of skilled workers as industry expanded.”167 Protests were again used as a critical 
change-agent, but these labor disputes were driven by discontent created when more 
costly lifestyles outpaced working-class earnings. 
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Increased pay provided the working-class with additional purchasing power to 
spend beyond basic necessities, and consumption rose in parallel with the rising 
household income. Figure 1 illustrates the rise of Korea’s aggregate consumption from 
14.5% (of Gross National Income) in 1982 to 15.5% in 1987. While the percentages 
appear to show only a modest consumption increase over the six-year period, the dollar 
amount (inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars) of consumption nearly doubled from $11 billion 
to $23 billion.  
Figure 1.  ROK Consumption: 1982–1987168 
 
 
Purchasing power for the average Korean increased swiftly throughout the 1980s. 
Moreover, the South Koreans became fixated on owning durable consumer goods, 
consuming a heartier diet, and purchasing trendy material items.169 The country study 
elaborated on this snapshot of middle-class consumption: 
By the late 1980s, television sets and refrigerators had become a standard part of 
the average household, and ownership of an automobile was not unusual. Families 
tended to consume more meat, fresh vegetables and fruit, canned or processed 
foods, and to eat less rice than in previous decades. They also dressed in modern 
fashions made from quality fabrics. Higher incomes led to significant shifts in 
consumption patterns. For example, in 1963 the average family spent 57.4 percent 
of its budget on food. Twenty years later, the share going to food had fallen to 40 
percent.170 
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Rising income led to rising material demands, and new consumption behavior was 
certainly evident in the lead-up to democratization. Scholars of this time period showed 
that consumption behavior evolved rapidly in the 1980s. Beyond the society’s top 
earners, demand for higher-end goods and services became fueled by the increasing 
appetite of middle-class consumers. Figure 2 shows that, in aggregate, savings in  
the ROK grew year over year in the five years leading up to democratization. Net 
savings, as a percentage of gross national income, rose steadily from 12.2% in 1982 to 
21.8% in 1987. 
Figure 2.  ROK Savings: 1982–1987171 
 
 
Similar to household income, the increased savings rates are critical to 
understanding Koreans consumption behavior prior to democratization. As wealth grew 
across the income strata during this decade, so did the spending ability of average 
earners. Andrea Savada noted “Korean consumers, whose savings had been buoyed by 
double-digit wage increases each year since 1987 … had the wherewithal to purchase 
luxury items for the first time.”172 As a result of this new domestic demand, the economy 
reoriented again from an emphasis on exports to satiating new material desires of the 
country’s own population.173 Savada concluded  “On the supply side, the greater growth 
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in services mirrored what the people wanted—more goods, especially imports, and many 
more services.”174  
The pro-democracy coalition ripened throughout the 1980s, and the consumption 
disparity among the lower middle class added pressure for regime change. On the 
precipice of the 1987 demonstrations, the ROK contained many incensed societal factions 
against the political economy. In addition to the inadequate wages for the working-class, 
Deyo highlighted “greater elite conflict; oppositional mobilization of students, church 
groups, and dissident politicians.”175  The strength of these factions combined during the 
punctuated events of 1987, and ultimately produced more pluralist-capacity in Korean 
governance. Evidence suggests that consumption patterns shifted inside of Korea at the 
time of the democratic transition. This shift in consumer demands coincided with a higher 
cost to achieve the evolving Korean middle-class lifestyle. The confluence of these 
elements led to increased agitation among the overworked middle-income earners, who 
could not afford the lifestyle they desired. The middle class’ role in the 1987 protests that 
liberalized Korea’s government is relegated to an ideological coalescence with the 
student-movement; however, evidence suggests that it is more appropriately attributed to 
the evolving consumption patterns of the middle class.    
C. TAIWAN 
Although far from an ideal democratic state, Taiwan’s economic growth gradually 
coincided with greater civil liberties for its society. After its defeat in the Chinese Civil 
War, the Republic of China (ROC) became heavily dependent upon U.S. aid and security. 
When the American monetary flow waned, Taiwan’s survival imperative allowed the 
Kuomintang (KMT) to suppress civil liberties and reorient the economy under the 
auspices of an economic growth mandate. Following tremendous economic growth and 
development, Taiwan’s one-party authoritarian system evolved into a more representative 
pluralist democracy. From its earliest days on the island of Formosa, Taiwan experienced 
three discernable patterns in its political economy: patronage dependence, soft 
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authoritarianism, and democratization. Taiwan’s export oriented growth relied on 
thousands of small private enterprises, and this structure allowed a more even distribution 
of the country’s economic growth across income strata. Taiwan’s leaders also preempted 
large-scale popular demand for more inclusive governance by intentionally divesting 
political power. The combination of these two elements prevented consumption 
disparities from becoming a driver for democratization. This section examines the 
relationship between economics and politics throughout Taiwan’s modern history.     
1. American Patronage 
In the early years of its relatively short history, Taiwan relied on massive financial 
assistance from America for regime survival and infrastructure creation. Referring to the 
1950s, Dwight Perkins wrote “Taiwan . . . had few exports (mostly sugar) and 
consistently ran large current account deficits that were financed mostly by U.S. foreign 
aid.”176 Even without assessing the current inflation adjusted values, the pecuniary aid 
levels were staggering. In assistance to the KMT “from 1949 to 1963, U.S. economic and 
military grants totaled approximately $3.7 billion, with another $1.3 billion in loans.”177 
Such large monetary amounts would seem to indicate aligned interests between the KMT 
and America, but it was clear that regime survival took precedence for Chiang over 
advancing U.S. strategy. Despite widely reported corruption and incompetence within the 
Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek skillfully manipulated international politics to serve his 
country’s economic needs. 
The ROC entered a traumatic period halfway through the 20th century, but U.S. 
military and economic infusions at the onset of the Cold War propelled the state into a 
distinctive position for future economic growth.178 In the waning days of the Chinese 
civil war, it became clear that the Chinese Communist Party would prevail on the 
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mainland. The ROC’s bleak future prospects engendered an economic growth imperative 
among society as a means to survive against a determined enemy.179 Moreover, the Cold 
War allowed Taiwan to transform under the U.S. security umbrella into a self-sustaining 
economic powerhouse. Richard Stubbs aptly demonstrated how Taiwan’s political 
economy was the “product of the sequence of geopolitical events that swept through the 
region from 1941 to the late 1960s.”180 The political context was critical to explaining the 
foundation of Taiwan’s economic success. At the end of the Korean War, preserving the 
KMT on Formosa became more critical to America’s interest in the global ideological 
struggle. President Truman’s Containment doctrine officially emerged in Asia in 1947. 
Prior to the Korean War, Truman’s administration was at great odds with Chiang and his 
KMT. Chiang’s inner circle embezzled huge portions of U.S. aid for personal enrichment 
while rural segments of society starved to death.181 In fact, Dean Acheson’s famous 1950 
speech at the National Press Club clearly put Taiwan outside of the security perimeter of 
the United States.182  
The onset of the Korean War changed the mindsets many leaders in Washington, 
and America’s monetary assistance became even more critical to Taiwan’s economy.183 
American policy makers naturally feared that communists would add hundreds of 
millions to their ranks if China fell to the spreading ideology. As John Gaddis explained, 
“the Truman administration found itself precisely in the position it sought to avoid: yoked 
as it were, for better or worse, to Chiang Kai-shek.”184 In the language of the 1951 NSC 
48/5, the United States’ interests were suddenly best served in maintaining the non-
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communist regime on Formosa.185 The president reluctantly increased both military and 
economic support to the ROC, and the United States’ strategic interests became more 
intertwined with the ROC in the face of Communist aggression.186 The coinciding strong 
American investment in the recovery programs for Europe and Japan made a compelling 
domestic-politics case to protect the ROC as yet another bulwark of democracy.187  
As aid continued to flow to Taiwan during the Eisenhower administration, the 
KMT’s incompetent management led to dire economic results for Taiwan’s lower class. 
Eisenhower realized the KMT’s fragility and sought to prevent the Taiwanese from 
turning on Chiang.188 Post-war portfolios revealed ROC peasants eating bark and leaves 
while the government continued to extract taxes beyond production levels.189 Chiang 
fueled the fear that his regime faced a domestic legitimacy crisis and warned that any 
future missteps could lead to a collapse. The Generalissimo played the issues of morale 
and legitimacy effectively to lobby the U.S. president for more aid. To be certain, the 
Eisenhower administration was more concerned about the Asian domino effect in the 
Cold War as opposed to Chiang’s hold on power.190 Washington balanced between not 
causing the KMT to collapse and not drawing the U.S. into the island’s defense.191 
2. Soft Authoritarianism and Export-Oriented Growth 
In order to understand the Taiwanese political economy following America’s 
patronage, one must first understand its brief economic history. Throughout the 1950s, 
exports were not profitable for Taiwan.192 Dwight Perkins described the island’s 
economic characteristics during its first decade with high trade barriers, overvalued 
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exchange rates, and restricted imports. In Perkins’ estimation, “import-substituting 
industrialization was thus the only viable industrial development strategy available in this 
context.”193 Initially reliant upon the American dole to establish infrastructure and fuel its 
economy, Taiwan operated at a loss while pursuing import-substituting industrialization.  
Through the role of small private enterprises, the Taiwanese population was more 
incorporated in their country’s rapid economic growth than Korea.. Beginning in 1960, 
Chiang Kai-shek promoted policies to spur the production of high-value exports. 
Consequently, exports levels rose rapidly throughout the 1960s. Taiwan’s government 
took a more targeted approach to economic development in the 1970s, investing 
resources and brainpower into the most lucrative heavy industries. While large state-
owned enterprises operated majority of these sectors early on, approximately 90,000 
smaller private firms came to control the production over the next decade. In the 1980s, 
Taiwan’s government made the push into the high-technology sectors and invested in the 
necessary human capital to ensure a successfully transition.194 The trajectory of Taiwan, 
like its fellow Asian miracle economies, transformed a peasant society into one of the 
world industrial powerhouses.195 Among other structural differences, the small private 
enterprises approach later created a smoother democratization process in Taiwan as 
compared to the chaebol approach in Korea. 
To achieve their remarkable growth though, the Taiwanese compromised their 
personal political freedoms for the promise of a better tomorrow. Paul Krugman posited 
that the Taiwanese “were willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the 
common good, take charge of their economies, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests 
for the long-run growth.”196 As a result of unique partnerships between bureaucrats and 
developmental elites in Taiwan, the Kuomintang successfully achieved national 
economic goals through centrally advantaged industries and an export-oriented 
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production model.197 Chalmers Johnson described the many aspects of the soft-
authoritarian Taiwanese economy in his examination of the Asian Miracle. Outlawed 
strikes, the lack of a minimum wage, and unions devoid of power all contributed to the 
high-speed growth in the study’s Asian economies.198 The results of Taiwan’s mixed 
economic compositions are hybrid combinations of market-based and command 
economies.199 Taiwan’s political economy during the 1960s–1990s was at the nexus of 
authoritarianism and capitalism.200 
Given the KMT’s Leninist heritage, the soft authoritarian model was not a radical 
concept for the Taiwanese and faced little domestic political resistance.201 Dr. Sun Yat-
sen founded the KMT decades before it moved to Formosa, and the party oscillated 
between the Soviet Comitern assistance and U.S. patronage during its early years. Sun’s 
successor as president, General Chiang Kai-shek, was also heavily influenced by Soviet 
military doctrine and politics.202 Thus, the KMT operated with a strict party “centralism” 
and was structured similarly to the Leninist model of the Soviet government.203 As 
Nicholas Eberstadt highlighted of Taiwan’s early political economy, “non-communist 
Leninism allowed for both the ruthless suppression of local opposition to the KMT 
authority and a simultaneous KMT sponsorship of commercial policies that were 
intended to enrich the local population.”204 Taiwan’s government was monolithic and 
heavy-handed by design, but economic growth eventually pushed partnerships with 
minority factions to form a more representative alliance.  
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3. Intervening Variables for Democratization 
As a result of its economic growth and deliberate decisions, democracy took root 
in Taiwan and representation became more inclusive of the previously outcast groups. 
The ROC commandeered an island already inhabited in 1949, but the KMT treated the 
native Taiwanese lower class citizens than the former mainlanders.205 The natives and 
mainlanders held nearly equal amounts economic assets, so inequality was initially very 
low on the island. The Kuomintang’s harsh treatment of the natives created resentment 
toward their new mainland occupiers, but there would be no political representation for 
the suppressed group to air grievances. Describing this social cleavage, Perkins stated 
“for decades most government jobs with any significant level of responsibility and most 
military officers were former mainlanders”206 Through the keen foresight of political 
leadership, Taiwan moved away from its exclusively mainlander government and 
authoritarian roots beginning in 1985. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, proved pivotal in the 
democratization of Taiwan following decades of economic growth. Eberstadt wrote, “in 
the Republic of China, the transition to a more open political order was a KMT decision; 
the execution of the policy was carefully managed by the party as well.”207 Chiang 
Ching-kuo made a series of decisions during his tenure deliberately focused on creating a 
more inclusive governing body. After several years of economic growth unhindered by 
political opposition, Chiang began the “Taiwanization” of his political party to be more 
ethnically representative of society.208 After taking this qualitative change, Chiang sought 
to change the structure of his party. In Eberstadt’s estimation “the transition toward 
pluralism and openness may be dated to a presidential announcement in late 1985.”209 
Chiang Ching-kuo, in his dying years, took the extraordinary step of barring his family 
members or any military officers from replacing him as President. This selfless decision 
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opened the possibility for greater pluralism and meritocracy in Taiwan. To be sure, there 
were many growing pains that followed the KMT’s relinquishment of total political 
control. Still, opposition parties were eventually legalized within a decade and 
subsequent election results slowly resembled plurality. A new era of political openness 
took hold within Taiwan.210 
4. Taiwan’s Middle Class  
The middle class’ role in Taiwan’s democratization, if anything, involved the 
political demand for greater representation. Evidence of a rising middle class clamoring 
for higher wages to satisfy new consumption demands did not surface in the Taiwan case 
study. Taiwan’s rapid economic growth was spread more equitably across the nation’s 
earners, and no notable tensions existed over socioeconomic immobility.211 The ROC’s 
income inequality remained low and steady throughout the years preceding liberalization; 
the Gini coefficient rose from .30 in 1980 to .33 in 1987.212 There was also a lack of 
political or economic crisis during Taiwan’s 1987 political conversion. As shown in 
Figure 3, the ROC’s economy was extremely healthy around the time of the democratic 
transition.  
Figure 3.  Economic Developments in Taiwan: 1982–87213 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
GDP Growth 3.6 8.4 10.6 5 11.6 12.3 
Inflation 3 1.4 0 -0.2 0.7 0.5 
Fiscal 
Surplus/GDP 
-0.2 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.4 
Current 
Account/GDP 
4.6 8.4 11.7 14.5 21.1 17.4 
Investment/GDP 25.2 23.4 21.9 18.7 17.1 20.1 
Real Income 2.7 7.4 10.4 4.1 15.9 12.2 
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Low inflation and high growth captured the pulse of Taiwan’s vibrant economic 
progress throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the KMT proactively undertook political 
reform on the backdrop of their healthy economy. Stephan Haggard described the results 
of this political masterstroke. The author wrote “the relative success of the government’s 
policies created a base of support that included not only business, but a wide swath of the 
middle class as well.”214 In other words, the controlled nature of Taiwan’s electoral 
opening pacified the middle class. Thus, democratization in Taiwan was a more 
managed, smoother process than in Korea. The difference was a result of economic 
choices and the ways in which the two regimes acted to incorporate or marginalize 
specific political-economic interests. 
5. CONCLUSION 
With the help of a selfless leader’s decision, Taiwan transformed from a heavy-
handed monolithic regime into a more pluralist democracy. After years of developmental 
growth, Taiwan liberalized its once single-party authoritarian state political system. 
Initially, the island-nation relied upon heavy foreign aid from the United States and  
its economy operated at an annual loss. Facing a growth imperative, Chiang Kai-shek 
commenced an economic transformation that culminated in a high-value export-oriented 
production. In addition to choosing the most lucrative economic sectors to invest, 
Taiwan’s leadership invested in the human capital to sustain its transformation. This 
strategy paid tremendous economic dividends for the island-nation, and it also spurred a 
more inclusive form of government. At the time of the democratic transition, outstanding 
economic performance and well distributed income created a low-risk profile for the 
KMT to institute political reform. 
D. COUNTRY COMPARISON: KOREA AND TAIWAN 
While the countries had similar histories and causal elements for their economic 
growth, Korea and Taiwan also had significant differences in their political economies. 
Although the Korean political structure was at the outset slightly more democratic than 
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Taiwan’s one-party system, each country operated under strong authoritarian 
governments until 1987.215 Both countries shared the social configurations of no landed 
rural elite, lack of a radical left to contest the governing party, and weakened labor 
movements.216 Korea and Taiwan similarly faced Communist-foes eager to overtake their 
young countries, and this squashed most political dissent for the higher purpose of regime 
survival.217 Finally, both countries enjoyed the rapid economic growth of export-oriented 
industrialization during the boom-decades for East Asian NICs. Beyond these 
similarities, several differences among them drove different paths to democracy.  
In contrasting Taiwan with Korea, dissimilar structures and conditions stand out 
the most. Haggard pointed to Taiwan’s “greater difference between government and 
business, a more independent technocracy, and a narrower range of industrial policy 
instruments.”218 The structural difference of having many smaller and medium-sized 
firms as opposed to large conglomerates demonstrated credible space between the private 
sector and the Taiwanese government—and also incorporated more of the population’s 
voices and demands into the political-economic strategies of the governing regime. When 
the ROC’s government did intervene in markets, its interventionism was much less 
severe. Haggard wrote, “the government did not attempt to steer industry in a particular 
direction, in contrast to Korea the process was more incremental and relied to a great 
extent on general incentives, the provision of infrastructure, and institutional 
supports.”219 Korea also experienced more inflation and external debt problems 
throughout period prior to its democratic transition, whereas Taiwan ran current account 
surpluses and price stability (see Figure 3).220 In general, Taiwan’s transition to 
democracy is characterized as much smoother process than what Korea endured. Middle-
class protests in Taiwan were unnecessary to achieve democracy because the regime 
headed in that direction; whereas in Korea, the regime’s more repressive strategy actually 
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provoked more protest and rapid change. As such, the tension of middle-class earners 
striving for consumption parity with the higher-income bracket was not a driving force in 




This chapter examines the genesis of China’s modern political economy before 
determining the existence of consumption tension among the middle class. The first 
section inspects the causal factors behind China’s astonishing economic growth during 
the post-Mao era. From there, the chapter explores the political tensions between the 
population and the government arisen since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms nearly four decades 
ago. Seven points of political tension are evaluated to determine their individual causal 
significance towards democratization. Following the survey of friction points, this 
chapter turns to analyze the history of modern consumption among China’s middle class. 
The narrative then provides an account of the evolving relationship between middle-class 
Chinese, the CCP, and the consumption variable. This chapter subsequently offers several 
examples of how consumption shapes the self-identity of China’s modern middle class. 
At the heart of this thesis, this chapter then examines the impact of Chinese middle-class 
consumption on democratization. The previous chapter’s case study of South Korea 
revealed evidence of middle-class consumption acting as a critical casual factor towards 
democratization. With the Korean model in mind, this chapter seeks to discover if a 
similar tension exists among China’s rising middle class.  Finally, this chapter scrutinizes 
the causal reasons behind political inaction among the middle class and offers insights 
into the future prospects of democratization in China. First, this chapter broadly maps the 
growth-yielding reforms that led to the modern political economy of China.  
B. REFORM AND ECONOMIC RISE  
Modern China represents the paradox of an unyielding one-party totalitarian 
government that successfully liberalized away from a communist-planned economy.221 
The Chinese stood on the precipice of their own growth imperative in the late 1970s, and 
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Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms that preserved the repressive Chinese 
Communist Party in power while lifting over 200 million people out of poverty. Doug 
Guthrie asserted that Chinese gradualism succeeded by slowly realigning the structure of 
its command economy. A few key aspects were critical to China’s successful transition to 
capitalism: relinquished state control, increased foreign investment, and a legal system 
that grew alongside the reform.222 More central to understanding the effect on 
democratization, the economic reforms did not undermine the ruling political position of 
the Party.223 Concurrently, the economic reforms created different interest groups within 
China’s political economy. In order to understand the current societal segments that could 
lend to democratization, it is important to first understand the effects of China’s reforms. 
The gradual and experimental restructuring allowed a stratified society to arise from 
decades of Party-imposed suppression on individual wealth and consumption. 
The CCP uniquely surrendered its control of state owned enterprises without 
privatization. A hybrid “dual-track” system allowed planned production for large state-
owned enterprises, but also provided incentives to generate above the target production 
levels dictated by the Plan.224 In a successful bid to lure external investment and 
technology, the Party allowed foreign companies to operate unrestricted in special 
economic zones.225 Moreover, the government steadily pushed economic control and 
accountability down to the local level.226 At the local level, Barry Naughton explained 
that “rural communities were allowed to run township and village enterprises outside the 
plan because doing so would contribute to local investment and economic growth.”227 
Agriculture surged after the Party took the unexpected step of contracting land to farming 
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households.228 Taken in tandem, these reforms incentivized more efficient outcomes 
across the Chinese economy. Naughton described how “markets were introduced into 
nearly every area, ownership was diversified, and competition created, all within the 
framework of the existing institutions.”229 The result was an improved quality of life for 
Chinese citizens through gradual reform. China emerged from the doldrums of backwards 
communist planning under Mao’s persistent desire for a permanent ideological 
revolution.230 Only upon Mao’s death could a new leader emerge and shed truth on the 
broken economic condition. Deng Xiaoping gradually released China’s pent up of market 
forces from a backwards economy under the tragically misguided cult-of-Mao.231 
The gradual reforms allowed China’s economy to flourish; but more importantly, 
the slow pace allowed the Party to adjust institutions when social grievances threatened 
authoritarian reign. China’s dual-track system, increased local autonomy, and a rational-
legal framework created conditions for a steady economic liberalization. Of China’s 
astonishing results, Dwight Perkins noted, “per capita income has risen more than 
seventeen fold during the most recent three-plus decades beginning in 1979.”232 Even 
though its path to economic growth was much different than the other Asian “Miracle-
countries,” China advanced on par with its highest performing regional competitors.233 
The socioeconomic grievances that arose throughout the 1980s culminated in the 
Tiananmen incident, but the Party shrewdly responded to this dark episode by creating an 
even more inclusive economy. A new phase of reform began in 1993, when the Party’s 
focus became restructuring institutions to suit all market participants. Naughton described 
this second phase of reform as a “remaking of the institutional setup to make it 
compatible with a market economy, the dramatic shrinkage of the state sector, and the 
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creation of conditions enabling fair competition among all market participants.”234 This 
adaptive approach to institutional realignment ensured even more recipients benefited 
from the country’s growth, especially the first wave of middle class.  
Unleashing market constraints for such a massive population soon catapulted 
China’s imports and exports to the top of the global leaderboard. Alice Miller noted that 
“in 1994 China became a net importer of oil, and by the first decade of the new century it 
was the second largest oil importer in the world, behind only the United States.”235 The 
phenomenon of unbridled demand carried over to more than just commodities. By 2006, 
China’s trade volume was sixty times more than it was in 1978.236 On the export side, 
China became the world’s manufacturing workshop. Susan Shirk observed that China is 
the leading producer of steel, accounting for more than one-third of global production.237 
With its cheaper manufacturing costs, China also fed the consumer demand in America. 
Shirk showed that “Forty percent of the consumer goods Americans buy from abroad are 
produced in China.”238 As such, China’s growth was in no small way due to its dominant 
comparative advantage in manufacturing cheap goods to the insatiable American 
consumer. As Chinese incomes rose and the first wave of middle class grew wealthier, 
the Party eventually encouraged domestic consumption as a means of furthering growth. 
This modern push to rebalance China into a consumption economy will face a deeper 
examination in a later section of this chapter. At this point, one should note that China’s 
economic growth was experimentally unique, and the Party’s approach was inclusive 
enough to ward off a sustained movement against the authoritarian regime. 
C. POLITICAL TENSIONS: MAJOR FAULT LINES 
To be sure, Deng’s reforms caused their share of negative economic consequences 
associated with overexpansion and inflation.239 It should also be noted that it is difficult 
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to determine the veracity of Party-state accounting, which often involves overstated 
growth and foreign investment figures.240 Regardless of metric accuracy and despite 
China’s astonishing economic growth, the CCP faces many modern problems that could 
renew a sustained popular movement toward democracy. As Yun-han Chan noted of the 
CCP’s dilemma, “beneath the veneer of rapid economic growth and political stability, 
there are myriad simmering social grievances against the government.”241 Many 
sociopolitical criticisms are still simmering inside the Middle Kingdom today. If 
economic conditions worsen as growth levels off in China, then the potential for 
democratization movements to arise would increase significantly.  One observer mused 
“Mao Zedong got pretty far in life by acting on his observation (in 1930) that ‘a single 
spark can start a prairie fire.’”242 To highlight factors that could become catalysts for 
democratization, this chapter now briefly highlights some of the major political tensions 
between the Chinese population and the CCP. Specifically, the following section will 
examine the Party’s suppression of Tiananmen, inequality, party corruption, residency, 
media control, welfare, and environmental issues. 
1. Suppression of Democratic Starts: Tiananmen 
The ruthless suppression apparatuses of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did 
not cease when Deng Xiaoping came to the helm. Guthrie argued that the CCP remained 
an anchor of stability during the early years of economic reform.243 Despite the growth, 
social unrest festered into situations remarkably similar to that of Korea on the precipice 
of democracy. Describing the prelude to Tiananmen, Naughton wrote “urban discontent 
in 1989 was fueled by a number of factors: rising inflation that eroded real incomes, 
anger at corruption and arbitrary privilege, and rising expectations about political and 
economic change.”244 Significant to this thesis, most of these conditions also existed in 
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years preceding the ROK’s protests of 1987. In yet another parallel, Beijing students led 
the protests in response to the death of a reformer, Hu Yaobang.245 In a final parallel to 
the ROK, “the sense that political promises had been betrayed and political reforms were 
running off the tracks fueled a powerful sense of disillusionment and protest.”246  With 
these striking similarities between China and Korea, one could be forgiven for assuming 
the end of authoritarian rule was near in the Middle Kingdom. As is well-known, 
however, the Tiananmen uprising did not usher in Chinese democracy. Under Deng’s 
orders, the military cleared the square by force and infamously murdered its own citizens 
to suppress popular dissent.247  In what could have proved to be a galvanizing turning 
point for the Chinese population against the CCP, the Party instead responded with 
masterful additional economic reforms and successfully maintained power.  
Tiananmen was yet another watershed moment for the Party’s first half-century, 
and the CCP’s inclusive institutional adjustments thereafter helped to bring the country 
back on track. Doubling down on the earlier reform effort dubbed  “reform without 
losers,” the government response to Tiananmen created less disadvantaged in both the 
urban and rural domains.248  Naughton summarized this inclusive approach: 
Rural residents gained from the dissolution of collective, improved 
agricultural prices,  and the rapid growth of nonagricultural production 
in the countryside. Urban residents  gained either because they were able 
to exploit new niches in the economy or because their economic position 
was protected by continuing government support for state enterprises. The 
broad enjoyment of the benefits of reform—and the absence of a group 
clearly disadvantaged by reform—meant that reform was still widely 
popular despite the debacle at Tiananmen Square.249 
Despite the minimization of disadvantaged sectors in these reforms, the increasing 
number of modern protests suggests that Chinese remain frustrated with authoritarian 
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rule. Moreover, Tiananmen remains a scar of ruthless Party suppression and sparks 
annual remembrance vigils. 
2. Inequality 
China’s inequality is one of the most prominent points of tension in modern 
China. Jie Chen’s research results showed “the population across class divides perceives 
the rapidly widening gap between rich and poor and the increasingly rampant official 
corruption as China’s most detestable social issues.250 This gap is more scientifically 
captured in the country’s unusually high Gini coefficient. The veracity of the Gini 
number reported by the PRC’s government is highly disputed.  For example, the Party 
reported a Gini Index of .474 in 2012, whereas other studies pegged the Gini coefficient 
in the same year at .610.251 Government truth-telling aside, both of these numbers 
demonstrate a wealth distribution-curve deviation highly skewed towards inequality.  
This inequality continues to grow along the rural-urban divide. Albert Park noted, 
“China’s economic growth is being driven by rapid urban development in coastal areas 
that threaten to leave the rest of China behind.”252 The disparity is especially noticeable 
within the rural sector, which feels increasingly left out of recent prosperity.253  
Underscoring the divide, Shirk wrote “the per capita income of urban residents is now 
3.23 times that of rural dwellers compared to 2.57 that of rural dwellers back in 1985.”254 
In order for the rural population to tap into this urban-coastal wellspring of foreign direct 
investment and global production chains, lower-class rural labors migrate to these cities. 
Park suggested that the labor flow response is not occurring quickly enough to dampen 
wage and productivity gaps.255 To be sure of this tension, Martin King White’s research 
discovered that most Chinese are not concerned about inequality when they perceive their 
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own economic situations as improving.256 Still, David Zweig cautioned that a serious 
economic downturn could quickly alter the complacency around the wealth gap into an 
explosive social issue.257 To remedy this rural-urban divide, the Party must act to phase 
out the household registration system (hukou) in a responsible manner, allow greater 
labor mobility, and make high-return investments in rural development and agriculture.258 
All of these remedies are easier to execute in theory than practice. Meanwhile, popular 
strife continues to simmer around this severely contentious issue. 
3. Party Corruption 
Another major source of anti-regime sentiment today is Party corruption.259 The 
perception of state officials looting China’s resources for personal gain is a major fault-
line with the population.260 Observers noted two forms of positional exploitation that 
threaten the Party in particular: “rising venality of office and alliances between corrupt 
officials and organized crime.”261 Despite evidence supporting claims of collusion and 
police corruption, these authors did not substantiate the claims of a “local mafia state” 
problem across China.262 Recent years, however, revealed several instances of high-level 
Party officials gambling with state resources in Macau.263  In 2012 alone, gambling 
revenues at Macau casinos totaled $38 billion.264 Of that total, The Economist noted, 
“70% was spent by VIP clients, including many CCP cadres and mainland-government 
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officials who used state assets or funds to gamble.”265  To be sure, President Xi recently 
embarked on a massive campaign to bring these crooked Party officials to justice. 
Describing Xi’s effort to restore the Party’s image, Evan Osnos wrote “In the name of 
protection and purity, he has investigated tens of thousands of his countrymen, on 
charges ranging from corruption to leaking state secrets and inciting the overthrow of the 
state.”266  In fact, Chinese covert agents are even successfully hunting and rendering 
former Party officials hiding within the United States.267 These efforts are very important 
to restoring public confidence in the Party. Authors observed that “Public anger over 
official corruption has been the catalyst for much of the social unrest that has rocked 
China in recent years and the reason why the Party leadership acknowledges that it is a 
‘life and ‘death issue.”268 President’s Xi’s continuing efforts to find, repatriate, and bring 
corrupt officials to justice is a huge success thus far, and can be counted as a legitimizing 
force for Party reign.  
In summary of these two grievances, inequality remains a major problem whereas 
the Party fares better on tamping down corruption. Objections around these issues are 
expressed across the spectrum of income earners, but they are most vocally aired among 
the disadvantaged lower classes.269 More central to this thesis, the largest source of 
tension for in the rising middle class is attributed to the lifestyle disparity resulting from 
the Party’s residency mechanism. 
4. Residency 
The household registration system (Hukou) creates a notable income and benefits 
gap between China’s lower middle class and middle class. Ekman described the Hukou 
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tension between lower-class migrant urban dwellers and the Party. She wrote, “Two 
different types of urban dwellers coexist, the permanent residents who are in their 
majority fully integrated within the consumption society, and non-permanent residents 
who are not—or are only partially—integrated.”270  This system encumbers non-residents 
with low wages and little social protection. Authors point to the many systematic 
disadvantages these migrants face when attempting to work in cities. William Hurst 
stated, “Most important, migrants do not have legal rights to work in permanent or formal 
urban jobs, or even live in the city.”271  
Beyond a lack of protection and fair wages, hukou controls many other lifestyle 
factors and personal consumption levels. Ekman observed, “hukou remains a significant 
limitation to the urban integration of migrants (leaving them with limited access to 
housing, medical coverage, school registration for children and other public services 
provided by the city) and therefore postpones the accession of this population group to 
the lower middle class.”272 These migrants witness the benefits bestowed upon the urban 
residents, and cannot afford that higher lifestyle. Non-resident children cannot enroll in 
schools within the cities that their parents work, and therefore often cannot obtain strong 
academic credentials to advance in society.273  
This tension mirrors the same friction point of consumption disparity found in the 
ROK case study. As Ekman put it, “they cannot afford an urban resident’s lifestyle, given 
their income level and limited access to social welfare … Many of them consume staple 
products in the city and save most of their disposable income for the family members 
remaining in the countryside.”274 Further evidence revealed that these migrants are forced 
to live in substandard housing, face social bias and difficult working conditions. The 
harsh conditions include long hours, exposure to toxic chemicals, and highly regimented 
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labor discipline.275 To be fair, the hukou system is credited with preventing the creation 
of enormous slums caused by massive urbanization during the Maoist era.276 Moreover, 
the government is taking this issue on to an extent. Hurst wrote “in late 2013, it was 
announced that the hukou system would be changed to allow rural residents to move 
formally to smaller cities.”277 The future of the Maoist era residency system is too early 
to call, but it remains a stark example of tensions between the haves and have-nots. It also 
parallels the ROK’s pre-democratic conditions of a lower income stratum desiring the 
lifestyle of the next tier, whilst being held back by the government. With its relationship 
to inequality and consumption, hukou stands out among lower middle-class grievances 
and will be explored further throughout the remainder of this chapter.  
5. Media Control 
Allowing the government to operate in the shadows, the Chinese media remains 
under the selective censorship of the Party. In addition to the censoring the troublesome 
content from several daily newspapers, the CCP also quashes attempts of major media 
infiltration from abroad.  For example, the Party forbids the global search and social 
media behemoths Google and Facebook to operate freely within China. Despite this 
censorship, the Party allows major television networks to conduct some criticism of local 
officials with as a means to keep corruption in check.278 Television is a particularly 
powerful medium for Chinese to receive information, especially in the countryside where 
Internet infrastructure has lagged.279 Rupert Murdoch’s attempt to gain market share 
illustrated the lengths of Party censorship in this medium during the early 1990s. Weeks 
after he purchased Hong Kong-based STAR TV in 1993, Murdoch gave a speech on the 
power of communication technology to threaten totalitarian regimes.280 STAR TV 
already penetrated much of China, and Premier Li Ping promptly responded by declaring 
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private satellite dish ownership illegal.281 Murdoch eventually landed a joint-venture 
television station called Phoenix TV, which is now ironically favored by the Communists 
Party for its nationalistic edge.282 Shirk found that by the year 2000, 95% of Chinese 
owned a television and two-thirds of those were connected to cable.283 Through this 
powerful medium, Shirk noted, “China Central Television (CCTV) is considered the 
most authoritative television network.”284 Investigative journalism is allowed to an 
extent, but there are non-permissible topics. Shirk summarized them: 
But anything related to individual leaders, the Communist Party, 
democracy, political  reforms, protests, discussions in government 
meetings, the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, human rights, Falun Gong, 
religion, corruption at the top, Taiwan, Tibet, and other topics that the 
Propaganda Department considers politically sensitive because they could 
subvert Party power, is forbidden.285  
Thus, media content is stifled when it touches one of these third-rail issues, and 
the Party’s image overtly receives little scrutiny. This is a powerful mechanism to control 
popular thought, but it also continues to be a source of tension against authoritarian rule. 
6. Welfare  
The CCP must also navigate a host of other demographic challenges in the near 
future, including welfare challenges. There is growing popular concern over future 
financial security. Partially as a result of the Party-imposed one-child policy, an aging 
Chinese population is poised to put severe pressure on the pension and healthcare 
systems over the next two decades.286 Shirk summarized the problem through the 
following numerical projection: “As the number of people over sixty years old multiplies 
from one hundred twenty-eight million in 2000 to three hundred fifty million in 2030, the 
demographic shift will put a heavy burden on China’s pension and health-care systems 
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unless they are shored up between now and then.”287 Richard Jackson observed the 
uniquely difficult nature of China’s aging population problem, writing “China’s age wave 
will arrive in a society that is still developing and modernizing—and that has not yet fully 
implemented the social protections of a modern welfare state.”288 These concerns are 
already reflected on Chinese minds, as the country’s high savings rate is attributed to the 
lack of welfare apparatus. As such, the population is relying less on the Party and more 
on their own savings and investment for future security. Among lower earners, this self-
reliance puts a difficult strain on household budgets. The PRC government is keenly 
aware that a failure to provide welfare presents significant risks of social instability.289 
7. Environmental Issues 
Yet another sociopolitical tension revolves around pollution. Shirk contended 
“life-threatening environmental problems are stirring popular discontent and violent 
protests that could short-circuit economic development.”290  Elizabeth C. Economy 
summarized the environmental woes in a 2007 essay for Foreign Affairs. She reported 
that China “has become a world leader in air and water pollution and land degradation 
and a top contributor to some of the world’s most vexing global environmental problems, 
such as the illegal timber trade, marine pollution, and climate change.”291 The Party made 
recent strides toward long-term pollution curbs, but problems still remain a source of 
immediate concern. In the short term and generally speaking, clean energy is monetarily 
more expensive for a country’s industrial base and energy sector to pursue. Thus, there is 
little rational incentive for a Party that pursued economic growth above all to move away 
from cheaper energy sources.  
Beyond the basic economics of this contentious issue, Economy wrote about the 
difficulties hampering CCP policy implementation on this issue. Explaining the pollution 
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problem, she noted “the situation continues to deteriorate because even when Beijing sets 
ambitious targets to protect the environment, local officials generally ignore them, 
preferring to concentrate on further advancing economic growth.”292 Since local officials 
promotions are tied to economic growth, they remained logically inclined to disregard the 
central authorities’ policy.293 In this regard, a major public health concern is going 
unaddressed (or ineffectually addressed) by the Party.  Popular tension over this issue 
pours out in the form of increasingly frequent protests.294 
This section has highlighted a few major tensions points between the Chinese 
people and their authoritarian government. Exploring many other fault lines is possible, 
but well beyond the scope of this thesis. Despite the seemingly simmering cauldron of 
many modern social, economic, and political grievances, the water has not boiled over 
into a sustained movement toward democracy.295 Seldom studied as a driver of 
democracy, the consumption variable offers insights into tensions created by lifestyle 
disparities. The evolution of Chinese middle-class consumption behavior across different 
time periods will now be explored in greater depth. 
D. CONSUMPTION IN MAO-ERA CHINA 
While a small yet ambitious middle class existed during the waning days of 
Nationalist reign over Mainland China, the Communist Party’s subsequent de-
stratification efforts quashed the identity-differentiating tool of consumption until the 
post-Mao era.296 Just prior to the CCP’s ascent to national power in 1949, scholars 
pegged the Chinese middle class at 3% of the total population.297 While the slice of 
middle-earners appeared paltry during that time, the group still enjoyed some economic 
and political independence under the Nationalist party.298 This small subset was also 
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described as self-determined in lifestyle ambitions and occupational advancement.299 As 
such, one can safely deduce that higher incomes and consumption abilities differentiated 
the middle-class lifestyles beyond those of lower socioeconomic classes. Nevertheless, 
the sweeping reforms of the Communist Party nullified the middle-class consumption 
variable almost immediately.  
Testing consumption behavior, as a variable driving political reform, generally 
requires a political economy whereby personal property rights, accumulation of wealth, 
and heterogeneous lifestyles are permissible. As the second chapter’s literature review 
demonstrated, the CCP continuously decimated these capitalistic elements throughout the 
Mao-era. The homogenization of consumption during this period is attributed to the state-
controlled rationed distribution of goods and services, as well the Party’s scorn for 
middle-class consumption patterns and lifestyles.300 Jie Chen recorded that “during the 
Cultural Revolution, a middle-class lifestyle was considered as a key indicator of class 
enemies.”301 Under such scrutiny, the highly educated and managerial stratum 
paradoxically sought to adopt the consumption patterns of the lower class. During the 
Mao era, the horizontal link between consumers and producers was severed under the 
Party-state’s redistributive economy.302   
After it nationalized private businesses in 1956, the CCP’s restructuring of the 
political economy virtually standardized consumption patterns across China for several 
decades. As discussed in chapter two, the Mao era government-dependent landscape of 
work units (danwei), state owned enterprises (SOEs), and a household registration system 
(hukou) dictated consumption in the daily lives of Chinese.303 Zhou Xiaohong and Qin 
Chen explained “resource transference and income distribution were realized through a 
vertical, multistratum bureaucratic system, running from the center to local 
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governments.”304 Such deep government penetration into society affected nearly every 
aspect of Chinese life. William Hurst noted that these institutions “provided not simply 
jobs, but also housing, health care, education, day care, pensions, restaurants, shopping, 
and vacation resorts, for their members.”305 Beyond consumption, the elements of this 
system provided proximity advantages to urbanites over the rural population. 306 In sum, 
the CCP, prior to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, imposed uniform consumption through its 
social and political design.   
E. CONSUMPTION IN POST-MAO CHINA 
  The economic reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping initiated the construction of 
a middle class and reintroduced social stratification among the Chinese. A market pricing 
system requires “that users of production factors reward their providers according to the 
factors’ market prices or their contributions to the ultimate product.”307 This reward 
system is credited with differentiating income levels, broadening inequality, and allowing 
an initial wave of people to get rich.308 The arrangement “widened the income gap among 
groups and among individuals of the same group, as evidenced by the rise of the Gini 
coefficient from 0.21 in the 1960s, to 0.33 in the 1980s, and finally to the present figure 
of .458.”309 As explored earlier, the swift rise of inequality during the reform period 
accounts for a major source of social tension today. The unequal distribution of rapid 
economic growth across China’s income strata also mirrored the situation in the years 
preceding democratization in the ROK.  Still, this differentiation among household 
incomes allowed higher income earners to assume the role and consumption patterns of 
China’s new middle class. 
The initial wave of post-Mao middle-class Chinese deliberately forged their self-
identity through consumption behavior for the first time in three decades. Consumption 
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among the new middle class provided “patterns that embody a change of lifestyle and 
therefore constitute the micro, or psychological, mechanics of their constructing a self-
identity and winning social recognition.”310 New consumption ability, through higher 
incomes, provided the means for Chinese to self-identify as middle class.311 Between 
1978 and 2005, the average Chinese worker’s annual income doubled almost every five 
years.312 This GDP boom in the three decades following Deng’s reforms reignited the 
desires for social status and self-identity through enhanced consumption.  
As the Post-Mao era began, the CCP encouraged consumption as a means of 
protecting legitimacy. The Party’s push for consumption initially sought to undo decades 
of government-imposed economic backwardness and maintain political power. The CCP 
designed its gradual economic restructuring with the intent of releasing state-controlled 
wealth slowly. This slow economic liberation allowed well-positioned individuals to 
accumulate private wealth much faster than the rest of the country. Deng’s reforms 
shifted wealth down from the central government in order to raise the masses out of 
poverty. Ning Wang pointed out a series of post-Mao policies, “including salary raises, 
industrial restructuring, and lowering the rate of accumulation, were carried out in order 
to eradicate the disastrous after effects of the Maoist Revolution, to improve people’s 
living conditions and overcome the legitimacy crisis.”313  
While life improved for hundreds of millions of Chinese, massive wealth also fell 
into the hands of a small, newly enriched stratum. More importantly, these sweeping 
changes effectively unleashed consumption and lifted the dark stigma associated with a 
middle-class lifestyle during the Mao-era. At first the middle class was an exclusive 
stratum, which could only be achieved by those in fortunate positions to take advantage 
of capitalist reforms. During the 1990’s, the Party aligned itself even more with the 
notion that middle-class consumption would boost the national economy.314  
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Party intervention spurred consumption again in the wake of a global market 
disruption, and this government reassurance initiated new consumption behaviors among 
the Chinese middle class. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the CCP encouraged 
domestic consumption to shore up slowing growth within the Chinese economy.315 
Summarizing this effort, Zhou and Qin detailed how the “central government proposed 
that new consumption highlights such as housing should be created; residence 
construction should be made a key industry; and consumption of telecommunication, 
tourism, culture, entertainment, health care and other tertiary industries should be 
encouraged.”316 This push spurred development, drove higher-levels of economic growth, 
and led to the creation of today’s many uninhabited “ghost-cities.”317 While the future 
consequences of these empty metropolises remain unclear, the Party-endorsed 
encouragement also spurred a middle-class consumption movement around real estate 
investment that will be explored in a later section. Under President Xi’s present vision, 
the CCP is pushing an accelerated middle-class urbanization process to encourage ever-
greater domestic consumption. Ekman asserted the CCP is aimed at “supporting the 
development of the middle class and ultimately help rebalance the current economic 
model towards domestic consumption, reducing dependence on exports and state 
investments.”318 As the Party shifts the state’s economy towards consumerism, the rising 
Chinese middle class will play a vital role in this process. This chapter now addresses the 
defining features of the modern middle class in China.  
F. CHINA’S RISING MIDDLE CLASS   
Understanding the perspective of China’s rising middle class is critical to 
explaining for the stratum’s behavior towards democratization. Since the Chinese middle 
class does not adhere to the expectations of modernization theory to date, it is also 
important to examine research findings that illuminate their attitudes towards political 
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change, personal success, and their desired lifestyles. The following sections examine 
each of these components before determining the overall impact of middle-class 
consumption upon democratization.  
1. Attitudes Toward Political Change 
The modern Chinese middle class come from a variety of backgrounds, and this 
social stratum views their political surroundings through their individual experiences. In 
order to understand how the middle-class views political change, it is appropriate to first 
discover how this group views itself. In an attempt to discover the lower and middle-class 
support for democratic reform and the CCP, Jie Chen conducted a probability sample 
survey of these strata across three cities.319 The empirical findings offered insight into the 
theoretical and political implications of the middle-class perspective. His study looked at 
attitudes toward democracy, measuring norms such as political liberty, popular 
participation, and competitive elections of government leaders.320 Overall the survey 
findings revealed a nuanced, if not peculiar attitude towards democracy:  
On the one hand, like most of the lower class people, most members of the 
Chinese middle class are vigilant about the individual rights that are 
closely related to their own interests. On the other hand, however most 
members of this class are not willing to claim their political rights (such as 
engaging in public demonstration and forming their own organizations) if 
such rights could possibly disrupt social order; they are not disposed to 
have a say in government affairs and to play a role in initiating a political 
change; they seem to support competitive elections only within the current 
one-party–dominated and controlled electoral system. From a comparative 
perspective, it has also been found that the middle class as a whole is even 
less supportive of democratic principles and  institutions in these areas 
than is the lower class.321 
These research findings are utterly fascinating to students of modernization 
theory, revealing the middle class’ perspective of their government. The survey results 
suggested that self-interest, under a strong social order, trumps the quest for individual 
liberties. Political participation, if thought of at all, appeared to be tangential to the main 
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concerns of this class—their own interests and future prospects. Where is this self-
interest derived from? 
2. Success: Money And Social Status 
McKinsey consultants studied the next wave of China’s middle class and outlined 
the drivers and expectations this second generation of relative wealth. Authors of a 2013 
report dubbed this group “Generation 2” (G2), which consists of 200 million consumers 
and accounts for 15 percent of urban consumption in China. Defining G2 individuals, 
analysts wrote “these G2 consumers today are typically teenagers and people in their 
early 20s, born after the mid-1980s and raised in a period of relative abundance.” This 
young cohort is also shaped by the dynamic of being an only child, which resulted from 
the Party’s one-child policy encompassing their birth-years.322  The report continued to 
describe G2 individuals as “confident, independent minded, and determined to display 
that independence through consumption.”323 Differing from previous generations, the 
next wave of middle class came of age in a stratified Chinese society capable of 
heterogeneous lifestyles and purchasing.324 With regards to the specific consumption, G2 
consumers are “prone to regard expensive products as intrinsically better than less 
expensive ones . . . seeking emotional satisfaction through better taste or higher status, 
are loyal to brands they trust, and prefer niche over mass brands.”325 Finally, this cohort 
primarily defines success through money and social status.326  One observer wrote that 
Chinese households “have the impression of having been ‘upgraded’ to a social status 
that is not theirs and fear returning to the status they previously experiences (poverty or 
lower-middle class).”327  
Based on this evidence, specific consumption behaviors already play a major role 
in defining the next wave’s self-identity. For example, Chinese in the modern middle 
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class purchase homes and automobiles to amass wealth and forge their socioeconomic 
identity. Zhou and Chen demonstrated that home ownership provided better 
representation for one’s social status than other consumer durables. Early purchasers, 
especially those in coastal-cities, amassed wealth quickly through these lucrative 
consumption decisions. Housing prices in China doubled throughout the first ten years of 
the 21st Century, creating a new wave of equity-wealth among the middle class.328 Private 
automobile sales also soared five-fold in the seven years following China’s 2001 
admittance into the WTO.329 According the Zhou and Chen, “to the Chinese middle-
class, private housing and a car not only represent consumer goods with which they can 
build their self-identity and win social recognition, but also practice fields for molding 
new notions of consumption.”330  The consumption of these big-ticket durables advanced 
the middle class’ quest to establish an elevated social identity. Underscoring this notion, 
marketing professionals still attempt to tap into the middle-class desire to separate 
themselves from the lower income strata. 
3. Aspirational Lifestyles 
Real-estate advertisements also provided evidence of the link between modern 
middle-class consumption and identity.  In what Zhou and Chen described as a shift from 
the functional to symbolic value of purchases, advertisers challenge middle-class buyers 
to acquire homes as a means to enhance their identity. The authors wrote that effective 
marketing strategies pushed homes “not because they are comfortable, but because they 
are guaranteed to manifest and promote their owner’s social status.”331 Marketers also 
portray their inventory as those chosen by the highest earning professionals (e.g. bankers, 
entrepreneurs). These advertisements are successful in courting would-be middle-class 
buyers.332 Thus, another firm link exists between consumption and identity in China’s 
middle class.  
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As thoroughly established throughout this study, consumption practices are 
outward expressions of Chinese class status. In addition to luxury brands, the upcoming 
wave of middle class seeks acquaintance to the wider world. Regarding the rising middle 
class’ desire to travel abroad, Ekman wrote “international exposure is for instance a 
socially recognized sign of middle class belonging . . . they also often enjoy their new 
status, relation to time and opportunities for leisure, vacations and entertainment products 
with enthusiasm.”333 In addition to a sense of belonging to a privileged class, foreign 
travel is an outgrowth of previously restrained practice. Prior to the post-Mao reforms, 
the Chinese (with some exceptions) were not free to travel abroad.334 Post-reform, the 
purchasing of foreign goods is another example of this class exercising their previously 
restricted consumption behavior. These desires mark yet another increased cost to 
achieve the middle-class lifestyle. 
Occurring in tandem with the growth of China’s middle class, the onset of 
globalization heavily shaped the consumption of China’s modern middle class. Beyond 
the economic growth available to developing countries through international production 
chains, globalization also shaped the behavior of the new middle class. Zhou and Chen 
noted the worldwide interconnectedness is responsible for “cultivating an international 
consumer market and corresponding values, life attitudes, and behavioral patterns based 
on consumerism.”335  In particular, the scholars point the similar consumption behavior 
between two socio-politically dissimilar countries--China and India. Zhou and Chen note 
that these two countries “vary in their origin, political status, occupation, religious belief, 
and even race, they resemble each other in surprisingly close ways when it comes to 
constructing their self-identities via consumption.”336 Shaped by globalization-fostered 
consumerism, the middle classes’ purchasing behavior in these two countries aimed to 
portray success.337 Underscoring this notion in China, Ekman found “consumption of 
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foreign brands and goods remains a significant external sign of integration to the lower 
middle-class population.”338 The act of consuming a McDonald’s meal or Starbucks 
coffee, for instance, carries significantly different weight between the lower and middle 
tiers.339 Having established the globalized perception of consumption-driven success 
among the Chinese population, the thesis will now evaluate how tension around middle-
class consumption could affect China’s democratization.  
G. IMPACT OF MIDDLE-CLASS CONSUMPTION 
Susan Shirk alluded to the dangerous nature of a tangible consumption disparity 
between income strata. She wrote, “The most politically explosive kinds of inequalities 
actually are the ones people can see with their own eyes, namely the extreme contrast 
between the lavish lifestyles of the rich and the hardships of the poor evident in every 
Chinese city.”340 At the heart of the political pressure-cooker associated with inequality is 
the very tangible consumption variable. As the previous chapter demonstrated, one major 
tension among the ROK lower middle classes in the 1980s centered on a visible shift in 
consumption behavior. The desired middle-class lifestyles became unaffordable, and the 
non-placated working-class rose to join the ranks of protestors for democratic reform. 
The same purchasing power disparity of unaffordable middle-class lifestyles could create 
agitation among the working-class in modern China.  First, this section will examine the 
consumption profile of the middle class. 
Akin to the case study of pre-democratic Korea, the makeup of middle-class 
Chinese consumption profile is rapidly evolving.  By 2006, global consulting firm 
McKinsey reported a major shift in the growing Chinese middle-class’ consumption 
patterns. According to their decade-old report, “families tend to buy more discretionary 
and small luxury items, and the share of the household budget that goes toward food, 
clothing, and other necessities shrinks.”341 This mirrored the shifting nature of household 
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budgeting found in South Korea prior to democratization. In fact, McKinsey’s team made 
a direct comparison of these two countries with respect to consumption. Consultant 
research found, “For several years now, urban Chinese consumers have dedicated a 
smaller share of their household budgets to the basics than South Koreans did at a similar 
point in their country’s economic development.”342 One safe assumption is that a basket 
of goods with name brands and luxury items is more expensive to obtain than its generic 
equivalent. Research firm Morningstar also predicted that current Chinese spending on 
luxury will grow at a rate of 8% per year. As such, this evidence of a shifting and more 
expensive household spending profile brings a key parallel with the ROK case study 
forward. It demonstrates a clear link between the two-country comparison and showed 
that a purchasing shift is already underway among middle-class Chinese.  
The cost of the desired middle-class lifestyle is rising, but the incomes of the 
lower classes are not keeping pace. As a result of their disadvantaged hukou position, 
migrant workers’ consumption ability are severely hindered by their unfortunate 
“outsider” status.  The sheer number of migrant workers, approximately 220 million 
Chinese or 16% of the overall population, makes their discontent a huge potential liability 
for the Party.343 Therefore, the lower and lower-middle income classes are institutionally 
restrained from obtaining the lifestyles of the urban-resident “insiders.” Ekman’s research 
confirmed that “the consumption practices of the migrant population living within the 
cities often remains to some extent similar to the ones they adopted in the countryside 
(i.e. consuming very little), as they cannot afford an urban resident’s lifestyle, given their 
income level and limited access to social welfare.”344 The income and benefits disparity 
are blatant to these institutionally underprivileged working and lower-middle class 
consumers. Illustrating their subsistence level consumption of the migrants, Ekman wrote 
“many of them consume staple products in the city and save most of their disposable 
income for the family members remaining in the countryside.”345 This observation 
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satisfies yet another element of the criteria set forth by the ROK model: lower classes 
being priced out of an aspirational lifestyle enjoyed by the middle class.  
High savings rates among all Chinese demonstrate the anticipation of future 
hardships, and this is especially true of the increasingly strapped lower and lower middle 
class. Individuals in the modern Chinese middle class are avid savers. McKinsey found 
that “today China’s thrifty households tuck away a quarter of their after-tax income—one 
of the highest saving rates in the world.”346 McKinsey’s 2006 report correctly predicted a 
waning in these savings rates, and a steady increase in net consumption across income 
strata. The World Bank’s most recent available data, 2009–2013, confirmed this 
prediction.  
Figure 4 demonstrates five-years of decreased net savings, from 36% of GNI 
down to 33%. To be sure, this is a modest decrease, and savings levels remain high. As to 
why, Ekman found “they save a particular high share of their disposable income in 
anticipation of hardship, given the underdeveloped welfare system and the rising cost of 
healthcare, education and housing.”347 Clearly, there are concerns about the lack of 
government-sponsored safety nets.  
Figure 4.  China’s Savings: 2009–2013348 
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Most acutely feeling that pain associated with the absence of welfare, the largely 
non-resident lower middle class shoulders a comparatively large burden. As a result of 
hukou constraints, the harsh reality observed of migrants is that their family’s first 
opportunity to join the middle class will not arrive until their second or third 
generations.349 Ekman stated “lower-middle class is often struggling to pay for cars, 
medical bills, mortgages, and their child’s education . . . once in adulthood, the only child 
himself often faces the heavy burden of financially supporting its aging parents and its 
growing child at the same time.”350 These observations provide even additional proof of 
an increasingly unaffordable lifestyle for the lower middle class.  
While savings rates decreased modestly, a simultaneous increase in aggregate 
consumption spending suggests that budgets are under even greater strain. Figure 5 
shows a modest increase in Chinese consumption, from 16.5% of GNI to 18.2%, during 
the same five-year time period.  
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In aggregate, the country consumed more and saved less over the last five years of 
available data. To be sure, these data points are also constrained by the inability to access 
a longer time series. The slight uptick over a short timespan is not conclusively 
significant by itself; rather, it suggests that scholars should continue to monitor and study 
the effects of these trends. Inflation hovered around 3 percent during that same time 
period.352 Thus, Chinese budgets were squeezed across the five-year period of most 
recently available data. Central to this argument, the mounting spending requirements on 
lower middle class earners’ balance sheets undoubtedly outpaced their income growth. 
Moreover, these lower income earners have to compensate for the lack of social benefits 
afforded to the middle-class residents of wealthy coastal cities. 
Taken in conjunction with the absence of welfare apparatuses, and perceived 
inequities stemming from the PRC government-mandated residency systems, the lower 
middle class appears ripe for increased levels of political agitation. This pressure on the 
working and lower middle classes similarly appeared in the South Korean case study. 
When this consumption disparity mixed with other social grievances, and was punctuated 
by student led movements, the resulting cocktail inspired protests for political change on 
the peninsula. Arguably, the same could happen in modern China. Adding to the 
complexities of this situation is the coming wave of lower middle-class earners into the 
middle class.  As shown in Figure 6, Morningstar predicts “the number of households that 
the firm identifies as ‘lower middle class’ will expand from 32 million in 2012 to an 
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Figure 6.  China’s 2022 Projected Income Segments354 
 
 
An increase of one hundred million people into this pressured income stratum 
could eventually create enough middle-class density to push for more reform. This 
chapter now examines the reasons this type of large-scale agitation has not occurred to 
date. 
H. POLITICAL INACTION AMONG CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS  
Several scholars believe the new middle class is widely satisfied and aligned with 
the Party-state. Ekman witnessed, “For the minority of the population who have already 
entered the middle classes, there exists a self-perception of being part of the ‘happy 
few.’”355 This fortunate stratum experienced liberation from the heavy workloads and 
financial constraints imposed decades prior.356 In comparison to the lower classes, the 
middle class feels like a group of “winners.”357 Chen observed that  “Given the 
preponderant role that the party-state has played in the post-Mao socioeconomic 
transformation, the newly emerged middle class has been created and shaped by the state, 
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and hence is considered to be closely associated with the state.”358 Through restructuring 
and reform of the previously collective economy, the state nurtured this new middle class 
into fruition. Additionally, the state actively recruited members of the middle class to 
enhance political ties with this important stratum.  Chen concluded that these measures, 
occurring during a formative time of this new social class, greatly shaped the middle 
class’ perception of the Party.359 The Party also explicitly links it goals with those of the 
middle class. President Xi’s “China Dream” is a key example that built upon Deng 
Xiaoping’s idea of “moderate prosperity.”360 Summarizing this optimistic concept, 
Ekman wrote “the ‘China Dream” mainly alludes to the potential for Chinese households 
to increase their income and improve their overall living conditions in the coming years, 
and progressively reaching ‘moderate prosperity’ by 2020 (part of the population) and 
2050 (the entire population).”361 This concept is a message of hope to the lower income 
classes, as a means to counter anger towards imbalanced development and high 
inequality. It also shows an alignment with the middle class, offering hope to those who 
operate within the institutions set forth by the Party. 
With respect to the current political order, this thesis has found evidence of a 
contented Chinese middle class. As a result, the Chinese middle class appears unwilling 
to participate in the process of democratization. The current middle class also owes its 
fortunate circumstances to the CCP, and many in this stratum are Party members 
themselves. Chen also discovered a value-congruence between the middle class and the 
Party across several political issues.362David Goodman similarly found the Chinese 
middle class to be “far from being alienated from the party-state or seeking their own 
political voice, and appears to be operating in close proximity and through close 
cooperation with the Party.”363 The tension theoretically expected between an 
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economically growing middle class and its authoritarian regime does not appear at 
present day.  Many entrepreneurs even established their businesses through a new or 
previous connection to the Party.364 While their goals appear aligned with the Party, the 
new middle class views their own political participation as secondary to their primary 
goals of career advancement and prosperity.365    
The self-interest borne from the quest for money and social status also yields little 
political pushback among the middle class. Jie Chen provided more support for the 
prevailing argument that the middle earners constituted a primarily self-interested group. 
He wrote, “. . . while the middle class may expect a system of checks and balances that 
could effectively constrain party power from infringing on their own economic and social 
interests, they are not ready to support and participate in political changes favoring 
democracy.”366  
1. Consumerism 
Under the conditions of globalization, Zhou and Chen found a positive 
relationship between middle-class consumption patterns and political inaction. Their 
assertion is China’s middle class finds consumerism and personal success to be 
incongruous with political pushback against the CCP.  The authors wrote, “ . . . in China . 
. . inaction by the middle class in political and social matters has been caused by the fact 
that cultivating public concerns is compatible neither with consumerism, which is being 
promoted by globalization, nor with the notion of personal success, which is increasingly 
defined by one’s level of consumption.367 According to this theory, higher levels of 
consumption among China’s middle class actually decrease their desire for democratic 
reform. This observation directly counters modernization theory, but it certainly helps 
explain the paradoxical nature of China’s illiberal democracy. 
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2. Crisis Intervention
Without adjusting its political control, the Party relies on its control of large cash 
reserves to both ward off fiscal crises and grows the state’s economic capacity.368 Zhou 
and Chen described this as a two-part process: “while the socialist state and its agents are 
actively advancing the market economy, mature market actors and adequate capital 
owners are equipping the former with an ever stronger capability to adjust the market and 
grab resources.”369 As an example of this, the CCP invested trillions of Yuan into markets 
during recent financial crises, thereby increasing the capacity of the state.370  
In a recent effort to further the economic transformation envisioned in President’s 
Xi’s “China Dream,” the CCP heavily encouraged middle-class investors to place their 
capital into China’s stock markets over the past several years. Many of these naturally 
frugal middle-class investors did not foresee downside in market dynamics. In early July 
2015, the Shanghai index plummeted 32%.371 At the time, the New York times reported 
“Across China, many of the millions of middle-class investors have been asking why the 
party and the government talked up the market in the months leading up to the recent 
plunge, and then bumbled in their efforts to prevent the rout.”372 Sensing the pressure of 
being perceived culpable for $3.2 trillion in loses, the government responded with a host 
of anti-capitalist stock market reforms. The Party imposed limits on short-selling, 
selectively suspended initial public offerings, and ordered interest rates cut by the Central 
bank.373 In turn, the government manually shored up losses with massive cash injections 
into the falling stocks of state-owned firms.374 The Party’s response countered market 
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forces by deliberately negating losses.  Such moves destroy the confidence of foreign 
investors, but they show the lengths to which the Party will go to keep agitation tamped 
down. To survive the legitimacy crisis of falling middle-class stock portfolios, the CCP 
essentially exercised monetary policy with Chinese characteristics.  By pumping liquidity 
into the inevitable fiscal contractions of China’s globalized economy, the CCP exercises 
yet another lever to maintain its powerful political position. This provides even further 
explanation for the lack of sustained democratization movements among China’s middle 
class. At the same time, it points to the possibility that if the CCP fails in such crisis 
intervention efforts there could be a groundswell of demand for change. 
3. Appeasing the Wealthy
The CCP also co-opts elites and the middle class operating on both sides of the 
Party’s institution structure.  The population’s drive for democracy can be controlled with 
adequate safety valves, which include placating the upper income strata.  A satisfied elite 
class provides an anchor of stability for the authoritarian regimes. China’s intra-
institutional elites enjoy the freedom to pass on their privileged status to the next 
generation, and the Party provides extra-institutional elites with opportunities to prosper 
through education.
375
 The elites who operate within the law can continue their family’s 
good fortune, while others still hold optimism for a brighter future through hard work.  
Jie Chen’s concluded that “as long as the ruling elite of the state remains determined to 
maintain the current authoritarian, one-party system, therefore, the middle class is likely 
to continue to indifferent to democracy.”376 A faltering elite could put strong pressure on 
the Party, but there is no evidence to suggest the upper echelon’s discontentment today. 
Moreover, Zhou and Chen highlighted a similar pair of safety valves for the middle class: 
In this sense, the Chinese middle class is a political rearguard for two 
reasons. The first is that the state has not loosened its political grip, and 
the present political structure leaves the middle class little room for action; 
the second is that the state, through its advancement of the market 
economy, guarantees economic benefits to the middle class inside and 
375 Zhou and Chen, "Globalization and China's Middle Class," 99.
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outside the institution, which undermines its demand for political 
change.377 
This highlights yet another source of social stability for the totalitarian 
government: contentment among the elite and middle class. With respect to reform 
pressure, the gradual economic realignment pacified the first wave of rich and middle 
class in China. 
I. FUTURE PROSPECTS OF MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRATIZATION 
The scholarship and analysis presented in this chapter reflects varying degrees of 
skepticism around the notion of middle-class democratization in China, on balance 
making compelling cases against the notion. Zhou and Chen conclude “little prospect of 
large scale conflicts between the state and the middle class as a result of social 
transformation.”378 Elsewhere, scholars arrived at the catastrophic missteps that the Party 
would have to take to drive sustained movements for reform among the middle-income 
stratum. Chen wrote, “the state’s enduring failure to deliver economic growth, maintain 
social stability, and increase or maintain employment/career opportunities and living 
standards for the middle class may help drive the middle class to support political change 
toward democracy.” None of this appears likely in the near term; therefore, the middle 
class does not appear a likely change agent. More promising for future democratization 
prospects, Chen’s book underscored the timeframe aspect of this assertion. Chen wrote, 
“in terms of political implications, the new middle class in China now (author’s 
emphasis) is unlikely to serve as an agent or supporter of fundamental political change 
toward democracy.”379 Chen’s research found the middle class to be unsupportive of 
democratic norms and institutions, and less democratically oriented than the lower 
classes.380 In other words, the middle class is comfortably situated within the modern 
institutional apparatus of the Party-state.   
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As the middle class becomes increasingly younger, others point to the 
potential for decreasing middle-class membership in the CCP. Ekman characterized this 
emerging generational difference within the middle class, which could lead to 
a political restructuring. She wrote:  
The new generations of Chinese middle classes may also be to some 
extent less related to the Party, contrary to their previous generation who 
often gained access to it through their former cadre position in a 
government affiliate institution. This is due to the fact that their middle-
income position is based on education and professional experience in the 
private sector rather than political loyalty and experience in the public 
sector, and this is amplified by the fact that international education and 
professional experience abroad disconnected them for some time from 
Party activities.381 
The author’s forecast offered a slightly more promising potential casual 
mechanism for democratic reform. Still, the consumption disparity occurring at the lower 
end of the middle class appears to be the most understudied, yet most compelling, avenue 
for a middle-class unraveling of authoritarian rule. The lower Chinese income classes are 
increasingly agitated by inequality, poor government regulation, and a lack of social 
security.382 In a comparison of political views among the middle and lower classes, Jie 
Chen found that “the middle class seems to be more supportive of the fundamental 
values, norms, and institutions of the CCP government than [lower class] people.”383 
China’s lower classes, as observed in pre-democratic Korea, are more inclined towards 
democratic reform.384 For instance, there are many recent lower-class protests and clashes 
against local governments. Zhou and Chen chronicled recent examples of these 
simmering grievances. They wrote, “Examples of such events include a clash with rubber 
farmers in Menglian (a county in Yunnan Province), a taxi strike in Chongqing (a city in 
Southwest China, and a riot by owners of demolished homes in Longnan (a city in Gansu 
Province).”385 This evidence of increasingly politically active lower classes, along with 
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the coming wave of entrants into the lower middle class, suggests that change movements 
could be afoot in the next decade. 
J. CONCLUSION 
As the ranks of the lower middle class swell, that stratum still remains in a 
structurally disadvantaged position. The current middle class, many of whom have 
benefit-laden residency in wealthier cities, live a brand-conscious lifestyle that is 
desirable yet unattainable to the lower classes. This condition is largely owed to China’s 
hukou system, which still affords official residents of China’s wealthiest prefecture-level 
cities and directly administered municipalities with tremendous social benefits over non-
urban registrants today. Such consumption disparity, under a high degree of institutional 
pressure, could become a driver for democratic reform as it did in South Korea. 
Modernization theory holds that economic growth poses a threat for the CCP, and a 
growing Chinese economy could still outpace the CCP’s ability to meet new societal 
demands. 386 To date though, the CCP is firmly entrenched despite a growing middle 
class. Several factors were offered throughout this chapter for the observed political 
apathy among the Chinese middle class. Many conditions surrounding the modern 
Chinese middle class appear to mirror those in South Korea during the early 1980s. In the 
case of Korea, the middle class tipped the scales in favor of democracy. Perhaps the same 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Under the expectations of modernization theory, scholars have scrutinized various 
causal factors for democratization throughout the last half-century. While some variables 
correlated stronger with democratization than others, Barbara Geddes’ contemporary 
reexamination of the subject dismissed many of the previously convincing causal factors. 
This thesis first surveyed the body of literature pertaining to modernization and 
consumption theories, China’s middle class, and the political economy of democratic 
transitions. This review revealed that scant research narrowed upon the middle-class 
consumption variable as a causal factor for democratic transitions under authoritarian 
conditions. As such, this thesis operationalized the middle-class consumption variable 
through a cross-country comparison in order to better understand its causal effects upon 
democratization. This study sought to discover the effects of middle-class consumption 
patterns on democratization in northeast Asian countries under authoritarian control.  
The first case study of this thesis focused on South Korea. The ROK’s rapid 
economic growth occurred under the safe haven of American military security. The 
country initially pursued an import substitution industrialization model, but a disastrous 
balance of payments situation forced the country towards the more lucrative export 
oriented industrialization soon thereafter. In conjunction with a strong authoritarian 
government, large chaebol conglomerates benefited from weakened labor protections and 
the technocratic guidance of a profit-focused state bureaucracy. Protectionism and late-
industrialization also lent to the state’s extraordinary economic growth. The rising tide of 
export-wealth fell disproportionally upon upper income tiers, and this created political 
tension between the disadvantaged working class and the state’s authoritarian 
government. Research revealed that the ROK’s authoritarian regime remained firmly 
entrenched for decades because of the government’s quick suppression of dissidents, a 
strong alliance between the military and private sector, and skillful political 
manipulation. The exclusive nature of the economic growth became even more apparent 
to working class Koreans as a consumption economy blossomed in the 1980s. South 
Korea’s domestic consumers began purchasing fewer necessities in favor of high-value 
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consumer durables and luxury goods. After tracing the political economy and causal 
factors behind Korea rapid economic growth, the analysis narrowed upon middle-class 
consumption. Korea’s political economy, particularly the disadvantaged lower middle 
class, became ripe to demand democratic transition as a result of cronyism and unequal 
distribution.      
 Evidence of a major tension emerged in the consumption disparity between 
lower-middle and middle-class Koreans, and this eventually led to the inclusion of these 
income strata in protests for democracy. First, the thesis explored the consumption 
patterns among Korea’s middle class prior to their democratic transition. The ROK case 
study revealed that middle-class consumption acted as a critical casual factor towards 
democratization. In the decades leading up to the regime-changing protest of 1987, the 
ROK experienced large and sustained economic growth. This growth was not distributed 
evenly across income brackets, as it was in Taiwan. Instead, during the five years prior 
the protest, lower middle-class Koreans became priced out of the middle-class lifestyle 
they desired. The working class desired to earn higher incomes in order to achieve 
consumption parity with the middle class. One interesting and suggestive finding came in 
the qualitative data. A much larger proportion of the Korean population identified as 
subjectively “middle class” than actually met the objective criteria; suggesting an 
aspirational desire to identify in the higher income stratum. This tension between the 
institutionally depressed earnings power and aspirational lifestyles of the lower middle 
class drove labor protests for higher wages. As a new wave of middle-class earners rose 
from the lower income tier, consumption behaviors among the middle class diversified 
from the basic necessities to non-essential luxuries. The new middle class’ agitation 
eventually coalesced with the student movement aimed at removing authoritarian rule. 
The addition of this large socioeconomic class to the protests finally turned the tide 
against the authoritarian government. This evidence created an applicable model to gain 
insight for China’s modern democratization prospects. 
The case study of Taiwan did not yield a similar causal tension for 
democratization around middle-class consumption. While its economic growth was 
comparable to Korea’s in size and speed, Taiwan’s political economy was structurally 
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different. Akin to South Korea, Taiwan relied upon American patronage and protection 
for survival in its early decades. The island also relied upon authoritarian interventions to 
keep labor protections low, which resulted in competitively low manufacturing wages 
among the global economy. While shared sacrifice of individual freedoms and social 
mobility were similar, key differences created less social and political tensions between 
the Taiwanese and their government. Instead of large conglomerates, Taiwan’s export 
oriented growth relied on thousands of small private enterprises. This key difference 
created a more equal distribution of the country’s newly acquired wealth across income 
strata. Another key difference came in political leadership. Whereas ROK leaders were 
mired by cronyism and an unwillingness to relent control, Chiang Ching-kuo took a 
deliberate step to limit his family’s succession of power and create a more inclusive 
political body in Taiwan. Less tension emerged in Taiwan because of its more evenly 
spread growth across a multitude of firms and a selfless leader’s decision to create more 
pluralist capacity. As such, Taiwan’s more even and less contentious process of 
democratization serves as the counterpoint to the narrative about the impact of South 
Korea’s and modern China’s middle-class consumption on democratization. 
With the Korean model in mind, the thesis turned in search of a similar tension 
among China’s modern middle class. Chapter four began with an explanation of reforms 
and the causal reasons behind China’s rapid economic rise in the post-Mao era. Deng 
Xiaoping’s gradual reforms allowed the CCP to remain in power while relinquishing the 
state’s grip over the commanding heights of the economy. Using a “dual-track” system, 
the state maintained the quotas of a central plan, but also allowed for township and 
village enterprises to produce beyond the plan for their own gain.  The Party allowed also 
land to be contracted to farming households. The central importance of state owned 
enterprises was eclipsed by the drive for foreign investment in special economic zones. 
Private wealth began to amass again inside China through these once forbidden capitalist 
practices. The ensuing economic growth lifted over 200 million Chinese above the 
poverty line. While the rising tide lifted certainly lifted all boats, the wealthier population 
soon found new grievances with the Communist Party. To better understand the popular 
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frictions inside modern China, the thesis next examined political tensions between the 
Chinese and CCP.  
Among the major fault lines between the Party and Chinese population, this study 
explored suppression of democratic movements, inequality, party corruption, residency, 
media control, welfare, and environmental issues.  Most pertinent to the question posed 
by this thesis are the tensions surrounding inequality, residency, and welfare. Owing to 
the nature of Deng’s reforms, inequality is especially pronounced along the rural-urban 
divide. The majority of rural laborers migrate to work in more prosperous urban markets. 
These migrant laborers remain under their non-urban hukou, which affords them 
dramatically fewer social protections than those with urban household registrations. 
China also lacks the protections found in a modern welfare state, and this lack of social 
safety net puts more severe strain upon low-income earners. In combination, these 
political tensions create the conditions of a consumption disparity among the middle 
class. Migrant workers of the lower and lower middle class are encumbered with smaller 
wages and less social welfare than their urban resident counterparts. The migrant 
population is also forced to bear the financial hardship of paying out of pocket for 
elements naturally afforded to urban residents under the hukou system. The advantaged 
urbanites have access to housing, medical coverage, and school registration.  
After discovering the most pertinent political tensions around consumption, this 
study surveyed the evolution of China’s middle class and its pre- and post-reform 
consumption behavior. During the Mao-era, consumption was homogenized under the 
classless design and ceaseless rectification efforts of the CCP. In the post-Mao era, social 
stratification emerged again under the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping. A small 
middle class began to use their consumption power as a means of establishing self-
identity. Consumer durables, such as appliances and televisions, were the initial markers 
of this higher social status. As the middle class grew, the new markers involved real 
estate and automobiles. At several points during the post-Mao era, the Party encouraged 
consumption to stimulate the national economy. Most recently, President Xi’s “China 
Dream” envisions the Middle Kingdom’s transition to a consumer economy.  The modern 
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Chinese middle class is consuming global luxury brands now more than ever, but their 
views toward democracy remain paradoxically complex. 
Survey results revealed that China’s middle class hold a peculiar attitude towards 
democracy. Among those surveyed, self-interest trumped individual liberties. Political 
participation also held lower concern than one’s future prospects. Consultant research 
found that the new generation of middle class defines success through money and social 
status. Firm links consistently appeared that tied consumption practices to identity among 
the upcoming wave of middle-class spenders. Thus, middle-class agitation towards 
authoritarian government did not appear likely based upon the attitudes of this income 
stratum. 
While the current Chinese middle class and their inheritors appear content, the 
working and lower middle classes are facing a clear consumption disparity with the 
middle class. Similar to the conditions found in pre-democratic Korea, an overworked 
class cannot keep pace with the consumption levels of their institutionally advantaged 
counterparts in the higher income brackets. Lower class Chinese earners are unable to 
afford the desired middle-class lifestyle, which could prove to be a major liability for the 
CCP. As a result of their disadvantageous position, non-urban lower middle-class 
Chinese appear to be the demographic most likely to push for a more liberal political 
order. Even more concerning for the CCP, the disadvantaged income stratum will grow 
precipitously in the near term. Projections estimate that one hundred million earners will 
rise into the lower middle class within the next seven years. 
To date, a few reasons underlie the inaction among China’s middle class towards 
democracy. With many among the stratum owing their advantageous socioeconomic 
status to the Party, China’s middle class is considered satisfied and even ideologically 
aligned with the CCP. The contentment makes this income class unwilling to push for 
political change. Globalization is also credited for preventing political pushback, which is 
antithetical to the coveted individual personal success in this stratum of Chinese society. 
Under this line of thought, researchers found that higher levels of consumption resulting 
from a globalized economy actually decrease the desire of China’s middle class to push 
for reform. The Party also uses its large cash reserves to intervene in times of fiscal crisis. 
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The Party’s ability to ward off crisis has also allowed it to subtly expand the 
government’s role in the economy. By flooding liquidity into fiscal problems, the Party 
pacifies the middle class while maintaining its hold on power. Finally, the CCP coopts 
elites and landed middle class through the institutional structures of the state. Elites who 
operate within the law are able to pass on their privileged status to their next generations, 
and the middle class finds intra-institutional optimism through the prospects of education 
opportunities. As a critical source of regime stability, the Party does not face pressure 
from these appeased classes of elite. 
The final section of the China chapter offered future prospects for middle class 
led democratization. For many of the reasons listed in the previous paragraph, several 
authors argued against the possibility of this income stratum leading a charge toward 
more pluralist governing capacity. To be sure, these same scholars acknowledged a 
greater likelihood of protests if the Party makes a catastrophic error in maintaining 
economic growth, social stability, or living standards for the landed middle class. Still 
others predict that younger generations of middle-class Chinese, with their increasingly 
international educations private sector reliance, will have less in common with the CCP. 
The most compelling narrative for middle-class democratization came at the heart of this 
thesis’ findings. At present, the working and lower middle classes are unable to afford the 
desired middle-class lifestyle. Lacking the advantageous urban residencies, these classes 
are often compelled to work in the cities without the social and welfare schemes afforded 
its residents. The visible disparities found between these income classes boil down to an 
institutional lack of opportunities for the disadvantaged classes. The danger for the CCP 
occurs when the aspirational and comfortable lifestyle of the middle class becomes a 
function of birthright. The lower middle class is projected to grow by over 100 million in 
the next decade. As this structurally disadvantaged group balloons in size, the impact of 
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